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The ability to make effective use of discovery outside a
forum state requires a thorough understanding of inter-
state deposition statutes. In this article, the author com-
pares various provisions of many interstate deposition
statutes and the two uniform acts. Additionally, the
author provides a detailed analysis of the practical prob-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discovery in jurisdictions other than a forum state is often a
necessity for proper litigation. With respect to lawsuits filed in
federal court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a con-
venient method for conducting discovery throughout the coun-
try.' While many states have adopted rules of civil procedure
modeled after the federal rules, 2 state courts remain courts of
limited territorial jurisdiction 3 and enjoy neither nationwide service
of process" nor nationwide enforcement of their orders.
Although a court in the trial state5 may compel parties to the
litigation to submit to discovery procedures through sanctions
involving the pending action,6 non-parties outside the court's ter-
ritory are generally not subject to its jurisdiction.7 Thus, absent
1. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
2. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 63, at 294 (3d ed. 1976). See
generally Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85 (1960).
3. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
4. The trend has been to expand the reach of state service of process statutes. See, e.g.,
UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROC. ACT §§ 1.01-.06, 13 U.L.A. 463-78 (master ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as UIIPAJ. However, due process limits the reach of state "long-
arm" statutes. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
5. Throughout this article, the term "trial state" is used to refer to the state in which
the trial or proceeding, in contrast to the deposition, is being held.
6. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1050 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Discovery). For a good description of the sanctions available, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Sanctions similar to the ones described in rule 37 are available in
most states. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Civ. P. 37; ME. R. Civ. P. 37; Mo. R. Civ. P. 61.01.
7. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
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some mechanism for enforcing a trial state discovery order in the
discovery state,8 any non-party not found within the trial state
may escape the discovery process.9 The demands of litigation,
which often require discovery of persons outside the state of trial,
make this result untenable. In light of the questionable contin-
uance of federal court diversity jurisdiction, 10 the problem
becomes particularly acute. If diversity jurisdiction is eliminated
by Congress, familiarity with the discovery methods and proce-
dures of foreign jurisdictions will be of even greater importance to
every practitioner.
The most widely employed discovery method is the deposi-
tion. Fortunately, every state"I has either a statute or rule provid-
ing for the taking of depositions of persons within the jurisdiction
for use in an out-of-state proceeding. 12 These state provisions vary
considerably, despite the existence of two uniform acts.13 More
than thirty-three variations of foreign deposition statutes"' exist
8. Throughout this article, the term "discovery state" is used to refer to the state in
which the person sought to be deposed is found.
9. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
10. See S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H1553 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978). See also
H.R. REP. No. 95-893, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
11. "State," as used throughout this article, includes the District of Columbia.
12. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); ARK. R. CIv. P.
28(c); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4311 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-103 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West Supp.
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2201 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976); IDAHO R.
Civ. P. 28(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND.
R. TRIAL P. 28(E); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:3821, :3824
(West 1968); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-401 (1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 11 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.1852(2) (1981); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); Mo. R.
CIV. P. 57.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1267.18 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 53.060 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18(1974); N.J. R. CiV. PRAC. 4:11-4;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970);
N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-05-22 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2319.09 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462 (West 1960); id § 1703.02 (West
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 45.910 (1979-1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5326 (Purdon
Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969); S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 19-5-4 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (1980); Tx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 3769a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(f); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1248 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-411 (1977); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); W.
VA. R. CIV. P. 28(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-115
(1977). See also D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28-1(b); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 305.11.
13. UIIPA, supra note 4, §§ 3.01-.03 at 487-94; UNIF. FOREIGN DEPOSITIONS ACT, 9B
U.L.A. 62-63 (1966) (superseded by Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act) [hereinafter cited as UFDA].
14. As used throughout this article, the term "foreign deposition" includes only those
depositions taken in one state to be used in another state. The subject of discovery
across international borders, while fascinating, is best left to other works.
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among the fifty-one jurisdictions. Many of these statutes may be
placed into one of several maj or categories. Nevertheless, there
remain over twenty statutes that defy categorization.
This article discusses and compares different interstate depo-
sition statutes and the uniform acts. Emphasis is placed on the
procedural requirements of these statutes and the practical prob-
lems associated with compliance. Finally, acceptance of a unified
system to facilitate out-of-state discovery is advocated.
II. THE UNIFORM ACTS
Two uniform acts dominate the area of interstate depositions:
the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act (UFDA) and the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act (UIIPA). The UFDA
was promulgated in 1920 and is presently in effect in fourteen
states. 5 Section 1 of the UFDA provides:
Whenever any mandate, writ or commission is issued
out of any court of record in any other state, territory, dis-
trict or foreign jurisdiction, or whenever upon notice or
agreement it is required to take the testimony of a wit-
ness or witnesses in this state, witnesses may be com-
pelled to appear and testify in the same manner and by
the same process and proceeding as may be employed for
the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings pending
in this state.
1 6
In 1962, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the other uniform act, the UIIPA, parts of
which were meant to supersede the UFDA. 17 Section 3.02(a) of the
UIIPA deals with the subject of assisting foreign tribunals in the
taking of depositions:
[A court].., of this state may order a person who is domi-
ciled or is found within this state to give his testimony or
statement or to produce documents or other things for
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.251 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2201 (1974); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3821 (West 1968); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-401
(1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1267.18 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 53.060 (1973); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-05-22 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2319.09 (Page 1953); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462 (West 1960); OR. REV. STAT. § 45.910 (1979-1980); S.D.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 19-5-4 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (1980); VA. CODE §
8.01-411 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-115 (1977); cf CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West
Supp. 1981) (adds procedural requirements to the UFDA); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §
3102(e) (McKinney 1970) (similar statute based on the UFDA).
There are slight variations in some state versions of the UFDA. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 31-05-22 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (1980).
16. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62. Section 1 is the operative section of the Act. Sections
2 through 5 are boilerplate sections dealing with the title, repeal, and uniformity of
interpretation.
17. See UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492-93.
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use in a proceeding in a tribunal outside this state. The
order may be made upon the application of any interested
person or in response to a letter rogatory and may pre-
scribe the practice and procedure, which may be wholly or
in part the practice and procedure of the tribunal outside
this state, for taking the testimony or statement or pro-
ducing the documents or other things. To the extent that
the order does not prescribe otherwise, the practice and
procedure shall be in accordance with that of the court of
this state issuing the order. The order may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or document or other
thing produced before a person appointed by the court.
The person appointed shall have the power to administer
any necessary oath.
18
Six states have enacted this section of the UIIPA. 19
While certain sections of the UIIPA were meant to supersede
the UFDA, two states, Louisiana and Oklahoma, have adopted
the UIIPA without repealing the UFDA.20 Because the two uni-
form acts describe different procedures for dealing with requests
from foreign states for process, the question arises which proce-
dure would be followed in these states. In both cases, the evidence
points to the conclusion that either procedure may be followed.
Section 3.02 of the UIIPA was enacted in Louisiana in 1966.21
The preamble to the Act stated that the new section was "to pro-
vide additional methods ... for taking the testimony of persons in
this state for use in a court outside of Louisiana."2 2 Also, the com-
ments to the codified section note that the UIIPA is to provide an
alternative method for taking depositions. 23 Although the Act pro-
vided that "[a]ll laws or parts of laws in conflict or inconsistent
herewith are repealed,' '24 the legislative history indicates that this
18. Id § 3.02 at 492. Other sections of the UIIPA deal with a broad range of subjects in
the interstate and international procedure field.
19. IND. R. TRIAL P. 28(E); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3824 (West 1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 223A, § 11 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.02 (West 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5326 (Pur-
don Supp. 1981). One state has made a non-uniform addition to the section. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981).
20. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3821 (West 1968) (UFDA); id § 13:3824 (UIIPA); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 462 (West 1960) (UFDA); id § 1703.02 (West 1980) (UIIPA).
21. Act No. 37, 1966 La. Acts 163 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3824 (West
1968)).
22. Id
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3823 comments-1966(c) (West 1968).
24. Act No. 37, § 3, 1966 La. Acts 163. It may be noted that Louisiana did not adopt the
UIIPA provision stating that "[tihis Act does not repeal or modify any other law of
this state permitting another procedure for obtaining testimony, documents, or other
things for use in this state or in a tribunal outside this state." UIIPA, supra note 4, §
3.03 at 493. In light of the intention to retain the provisions of the UFDA, this sec-
tion should have been enacted. See id § 3.03 commissioners' comment at 494.
19811
Baltimore Law Review
section only added to the field of foreign deposition procedure.
Consequently, the UFDA provision is not "in conflict or incon-
sistent" with the UIIPA. Based on the judicial decisions and the
history of the statute, the only reasonable interpretation is that
both the UFDA and the UIIPA exist concurrently in Louisiana,
and parties have the option of proceeding under either one.2"
The same option exists under Oklahoma law. In adopting the
UIIPA, Oklahoma enacted 26 a section of the UIIPA which pro-
vides that the Act does not change or repeal existing law.27 This
section negates any inference of implied repeal, 2 and the UFDA
was not expressly repealed in Oklahoma. Therefore, both the
UIIPA and the UFDA remain in effect in Oklahoma.
For several reasons, the UFDA should be repealed upon the
enactment of the UIIPA. First, the draftsmen of the UIIPA in-
tended for the later uniform act to supersede the former.29 Second,
the UFDA adds nothing to state procedure under the UIIPA. A
court acting under the UIIPA has the discretion to require the
same procedure for taking a deposition to be used elsewhere as is
employed for taking a deposition to be used in state, thus making
the UFDA same manner provision superfluous.3 0 Finally, the
UIIPA liberalizes the procedure for taking depositions that are to
be used in another state. Maintaining the older provision can only
result in confusion.3' Accordingly, the UFDA should be repealed
in both Louisiana and Oklahoma.
III. PROCEDURE
A. Tribunals and Persons to Whom Discovery
State Court Assistance is Available
When utilizing interstate deposition statutes, practitioners
must first determine to whom the assistance of the discovery
state court is available. This determination is twofold. First, the
statutes often discuss the particular tribunal to which assistance
25. Because Louisiana courts do not favor repeals by implication, Gulf Oil Corp. v. State
Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 587 (La. 1975); Liter v. City of Baton Rouge, 258 La. 175,
187, 245 So. 2d 398, 402 (1971), and only where the obvious purpose of the law is to
cover the entire subject matter does it supersede prior pertinent legislation, see
Johnson v. Sewerage Dist. No. 2, 239 La. 840, 858, 120 So. 2d 262, 268 (1960), the con-
clusion can be drawn that Louisiana's adoption of the UIIPA did not repeal the
UFDA.
26. Act of May 24, 1965, ch. 144, § 6.01, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 168 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1706.01 (West 1980)).
27. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 6.01 at 506.
28. In any event, repeals by implication are not favored by the Oklahoma courts. AMF
Tubescope Co. v. Hatchel, 547 P.2d 374, 380 (Okla. 1976). There must be an irrecon-
cilable conflict before a later statute will repeal an earlier one, and this is not the case
here. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484, 487 (Okla. 1972).
29. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492.
30. See id § 3.02 at 492; id § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 493.
31. See id § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 493.
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will be given. Second, some statutes also mention the persons who
may receive assistance from the discovery state.
1. Tribunals for Which a Discovery State
Court Will Facilitate Discovery
Discovery is advantageous not only in judicial proceedings
but also in adjudicatory hearings before state administrative
agencies3 2 and in other types of civil investigations. 3 States in
which discovery is to be had, however, may wish to limit the
extent to which discovery requests emanating from the non-
judicial arena may be assisted. The language of some interstate
deposition statutes clearly reflects a preference for assisting
courts rather than other, less formal adjudicatory bodies, while the
language of other statutes is less clear.
A number of statutes contemplate that the discovery state
court will assist only in the taking of depositions to be used in the
court of another state. This is expressed in several different ways.
One of the most restrictive statutes is found in Connecticut.
34
Depositions may be taken only if they will be "used as evidence in
a civil action or probate proceeding in any court." 35 The "used as
evidence" requirement may foreclose the use of depositions that
may lead to admissible evidence, a common modern discovery
practice.3 6 This limitation causes the Connecticut statute to be
unduly narrow.
Other statutes, while not as restrictive as the Connecticut
statute, nevertheless reflect a preference for assisting only courts.
In South Carolina, for example, the necessary commission must
be issued by "any court of judicature" for testimony "touching
any cause, matter or thing depending in such court. 3 7 The North
Dakota statute adds a non-uniform provision to the UFDA.
Although the statute follows the UFDA in requiring that the
"mandate, writ, or commission" be issued by a "court of record,"
it adds that the testimony obtained must "be used in a civil action
or proceeding." 8 Similarly, the Alabama and North Carolina rules
allow assistance in taking depositions "to be used in proceedings
pending in the courts of any other state,"3 9 while the Arkansas
32. See generally 4 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 23.03
(1979).
33. See In re Klein, 309 N.Y. 474, 131 N.E.2d 888 (1956).
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981).
35. Id
36. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2008 (1970) (discussing relevance under the federal rules) [hereinafter
cited as 8 WRIGHT & MILLER].
37. S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-05-22 (1976). For a discussion of the UFDA in this context, see
text accompanying notes 55-58 infra.
39. ALA. R. CIv. P. 28(b); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
1981|
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rule refers to a "judicial proceeding.' 0 Language to the same
effect is found in the Arizona rule, which provides that a party
seeking assistance file an application stating "the court in which
[the action] is pending.' 1 Both the District of Columbia and Ill-
nois allow assistance for depositions to be used "in an action pend-
ing in a court.' 2 Finally, the New Hampshire statute states that
the deposition must be used "in causes pending in [a] court of
record."43
Other statutes do not mention the word court or similar terms
and, thus, the argument can be made that court assistance may
extend to other tribunals. In three states, however, there is other
language in the statute that undercuts this argument. The New
Mexico provision allows assistance to litigants taking depositions
"for use in a legal proceeding or cause."" This language is quali-
fied, however, by a requirement that the order for taking the depo-
sition be "made by the court or judge in a foreign state,'4 5 thereby
limiting New Mexico's assistance to judicial proceedings. The
Rhode Island statute authorizes assistance only in taking deposi-
tions "to be used on the trial of any cause pending in a tribunal of
any other state."' 6 Although the use of "tribunal" may be ambigu-
ous, use of the word "trial" indicates that "tribunal" is synony-
mous with "court." The language of the Minnesota rule also indi-
cates that assistance is available only for judicial proceedings.
7 It
merely states that "[piroof of service of notice.., in a state where
the action is pending" is sufficient to obtain assistance. 48 In the
context of the rule, however, "action" takes on a decidedly judicial
meaning.
Some statutes use even broader language in describing the
tribunals that may obtain assistance. For instance, a fair number
of statutes authorize assistance to persons wishing to obtain
depositions for use in a "proceeding."' 49 The Wisconsin statute
authorizes assistance when the testimony is to be used "in any
action, cause or proceeding pending in [another] state."6 0 The
40. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
41. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-103 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981-1982). See also D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28-1(b).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974).
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
45. Id
46. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969).
47. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04.
48. Id
49. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976);
Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d);
N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
50. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
[Vol. 11
Interstate Deposition Statutes
Utah rule is similar.51 The Washington rule has no restrictions on
the use of a deposition, so long as the person to take it is "author-
ized . .. by the laws of another state. '52 Also subject to broad
interpretation are the statutes of Delaware and Hawaii. The Dela-
ware provision states that "[w]hen a commission is issued by any
court... or [when] any other proceeding has been taken for the
purpose of taking testimony," a subpoena will be issued. 53 The
Hawaii statute uses essentially the same language.14 Both of these
statutes leave open the possibility of assisting persons seeking to
take a deposition for use in a tribunal other than a court.
The two uniform acts lend themselves to an expansive reading
because they do not limit the use to which a deposition may be
put. Instead, they require only that the deposition order come
from a particular body. Under the UFDA, "any court of record in
any other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction" must
issue the order.55 The statutes of California and New York, based
at least in part on the UFDA, contain the same language.56 Similar
language may also be found in the statutes of Colorado and Ver-
mont.57 Thus, the possibility exists that the taking of depositions
for use in non-judicial proceedings may be assisted so long as a
court of record is interposed and orders the deposition. 58 This
interpretation should foreclose any abuses that might arise if a
wide range of non-judicial bodies were able to seek assistance for
discovery orders in the discovery state. The UIIPA adopts this
broad interpretation. It states that a court in the discovery state
will aid the taking of testimony "for use in a proceeding pending
in a tribunal outside [the] state. ' 59 The Commissioners' Comment
bolsters the argument that "tribunal" is to be viewed broadly:
"The term 'tribunal' is intended to encompass any body perform-
ing a judicial function. Thus, for example, a request emanating
from an investigating magistrate in a foreign country should be
honored." 60 Furthermore, when fashioning its order, the discovery
51. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f).
52. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).
54. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976).
55. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62. For a compilation of those states in which the UFDA
is presently in force, see note 15 supra. Because of a non-uniform addition, the North
Dakota statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-05-22 (1976), has already been discussed. See
text accompanying note 38 supra.
56. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e)
(McKinney 1970).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973). The Ver-
mont statute has the broadest language, in stating that assistance may be rendered
to "[a] person who is appointed or commissioned by the governor or a court of record
of another state." Id
58. But see In re Klein, 309 N.Y. 474, 131 N.E.2d 888 (1956).
59. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492-93. For a compilation of those states in which §
3.02 of the UIIPA is currently in force, see note 19 supra.
60. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492-93.
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state court "may take into account ... the character of the pro-
ceedings. ' ' 61 Thus, the UIIPA prevents abuse by invoking the
court's discretion.
There may be pitfalls to broadly interpreting interstate depo-
sition statutes to include non-judicial bodies or proceedings, as
illustrated by In re Klein.62 In that case, a New Jersey statute
authorized judges to make a summary investigation into the
affairs of a municipality when forty-nine or more freeholders peti-
tioned the court alleging that municipal funds were being used
improperly. 6 In response to such a petition, the New Jersey
Superior Court appointed an attorney to investigate alleged cor-
ruption in the award of a garbage hauling contract to Klein. 4 The
court then specially appointed the attorney to apply to the New
York courts for a subpoena directed to Klein, a New York resi-
dent. A subpoena was issued in New York, but Klein failed to
appear for the deposition. The case arose out of efforts to force
Klein to obey the subpoena.
6 5
At the time of the case, the New York interstate deposition
statute provided: "A party to an action, suit or special proceeding,
civil or criminal, pending in a court without the state .... may
obtain . . . the testimony of a witness, and, in connection there-
with, the production of books and papers, within the state, to be
used in the action, suit or special proceeding." 6 Klein argued that
the New Jersey investigation was not an "action, suit or special
proceeding" and, thus, the New York courts were powerless to
assist it.67 After reviewing both New York law interpreting the
language of the statute and New Jersey cases reviewing the
actions of judges under the investigation statute, the Court of
Appeals of New York agreed with Klein. The court looked to three
important criteria for determining whether the proceeding was
judicial: "(1) the presence of parties, (2) the trial and determination
of issues, and (3) a final order or judgment of rights, duties or lia-
bilities. '68 Because the action under the investigation statute
failed to satisfy the last two criteria, the court felt it was re-
strained from acting:
61. Id at 492.
62. 309 N.Y. 474, 131 N.E.2d 888 (1956).
63. Id at 480, 131 N.E.2d at 889.
64. Id. at 477, 131 N.E.2d at 889.
65. Id at 477-78, 131 N.E.2d at 889-90. Klein originally moved to quash the subpoena,
but the motion was denied. Id at 477, 131 N.E.2d at 889-90. Subsequently, the at-
torney sought and obtained a show cause order against Klein, and an order directing
Klein to appear was issued. Id at 477-78, 131 N.E.2d at 890.
66. Id at 478, 131 N.E.2d at 890. For the statute presently in force in New York, see N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970).
67. 309 N.Y. 474, 479, 131 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1956).
68. Id at 481, 131 N.E.2d at 891-92.
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[T]his investigation is a proceeding whose very purpose is
a broad and all-inclusive. inquiry into municipal govern-
ment looking to the publication of facts as such.... Such
a proceeding does not fall within the definition of "action,
suit or special proceeding" as those terms are used in our
statutes. That being so, there was no authority for the
issuance of the subpoena .... or for the subsequent order
directing the examination of [Klein].
6 9
A short dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Desmond. 70 He
noted that the statute was simple and should be liberally con-
strued.71 Further, he stated that "[s]uch inclusive and sweeping
language as 'action, suit or special proceeding, civil or criminal'
must have been intended to cover any and every kind of foreign
judicial proceeding, whatever its name or special features. ' 72 Thus,
Judge Desmond adopted a more expansive view of the New York
statute.
Klein offers support for the proposition that courts will criti-
cally view non-traditional bodies and proceedings when requests
for discovery assistance arise. However, its holding should not be
broadly construed. Jurisdictions may empower non-judicial
bodies to perform judicial functions, including powers to issue and
enforce subpoenas. Discovery states should seek to enforce these
orders, provided the interstate deposition statute has wording
flexible enough to support such a result. 73 A court may protect
against abuse by scrutinizing the nature of the proceeding and
wielding its discretion in appropriate cases. 4
The result in Klein will hopefully not foreclose what appears
to be a reasonable means of enforcing the discovery orders of non-
court bodies within the bounds of statutes like the UFDA. As pre-
viously noted, the language of the UFDA supports the conclusion
that, so long as a court of record rules on another body's discovery
request before it is presented to the discovery state court, it
should be enforced. 75 In Klein, however, the court did specifically
authorize Klein's deposition. 76 Usually, the interposition of a trial
state court between the discovery state court and the body seek-
ing a deposition should be enough to protect against abuses and,
thus, to ensure discovery state court assistance. Once a trial state
court adds its "seal of approval" to the necessity for the deposi-
69. Id at 486, 131 N.E.2d at 895.
70. Id at 486-87, 131 N.E.2d at 895 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
71. Id at 486, 131 N.E.2d at 895 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
72. Id (Desmond, J., dissenting).
73. The statute at issue in In re Klein did have that flexibility. See id (Desmond, J.,
dissenting).
74. See UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492.
75. See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
76. 309 N.Y. 474, 477, 131 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1956).
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tion, the discovery state court should enforce a discovery request
within the bounds of the interstate deposition statute.
2. Persons Who May Seek Discovery
Once it is established that the trial state proceeding is one that
the interstate deposition statute empowers the discovery state
court to assist, the language of the statute must be reviewed for
possible limitations on individuals who may seek assistance. In
most cases, it is unlikely that anyone but parties to an action would
seek depositions. However, since it is possible for non-parties to
take depositions," it is important to look at any potential limita-
tions.
A few interstate deposition statutes limit their reach to par-
ties. The Arkansas rule states that "[a] party desiring to take a
deposition.., for use in a judicial proceeding" may have his wit-
nesses subpoenaed.78 Likewise, the Connecticut and Utah statutes
provide that any party to an action or proceeding may apply for
an order compelling a deposition.Y Other statutes also use the
term "party," but reading the term in context leaves open the
possibility that it is meant in a less technical sense. 0 These
statutes use "party" without the qualifying terms "to an action"
or the like and thus indicate that "party" is synonymous with
"person.""' Even though another interpretation would also be rea-
sonable, a broad interpretation of these statutes is desirable.
Rules in two states provide that "[a] person desiring to take
depositions.., to be used in proceedings pending in the courts of
any other state" may be assisted. 2 Although limitations as to
which tribunals may be assisted are indicated, 3 a person author-
ized to take a deposition to be used in a trial state proceeding,
even if not a party, should be able to compel testimony in the dis-
covery state under these rules.
8
A number of statutes make this result more explicit. The Iowa
and Wisconsin statutes permit a "person authorized" to take a
77. See, e.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 27.01(1); TEx. R. Civ. P. 187(1).
78. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f).
80. "Party" may be defined as "a person or group taking one side of a question, dispute
or contest" or "a particular individual." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
836 (1973); cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 (5th ed. 1979) (party may be defined
both technically and non-technically).
81. See ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30(h); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974); D.C. SUPER. CT. R.
Civ. P. 28-I(b); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h). The District of Columbia rule
was promulgated to carry out the interstate deposition statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-103 (1973).
82. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
83. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
84. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 27 (depositions before action).
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deposition to seek assistance in the discovery state.6 Similarly, in
Illinois and Washington, an "officer or person authorized" may
seek assistance, 6 while in Mississippi and New Hampshire, the
class of individuals includes any "commissioner or other person
appointed. ' 1T Any "person having obtained [a] commission or his
agent" may seek a subpoena for a deposition in South Carolina.88
Finally, in Vermont, "[a] person who is appointed or commis-
sioned" may compel testimony."9 Generally, these statutes allow
assistance to anyone authorized to take a deposition by the laws
of the trial state.
The UIIPA also contains a broad provision. It authorizes
assistance to any "interested person" who makes application.9"
Although the Commissioners' Comment does not mention the
scope of the term "interested person," the liberal nature of the
UIIPA should lead to an expansive construction of the term.91
A majority of states have discovery statutes that do not
include limitations on the persons to whom the discovery court
may grant assistance. While these statutes are of several types,
the general rule seems to be that, so long as the law of the trial
state authorizes a person to take a deposition, the discovery state
court should assist him in doing so. One group of statutes expressly
states this principle. These statutes generally provide that
"[wihenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this state
pursuant to the laws of another state," the discovery state court
may compel appearance at the deposition.92 While not as explicit as
others, the Minnesota rule mandates a similar conclu-
sion.93 The language of these statutes indicates that the law of the
trial state is dispositive; there is no indication that the discovery
state may place further limits on the persons to be assisted. The
UFDA also fails to mention limitations pertaining to persons who
may request assistance.94 Therefore, a non-party authorized by an
out-of-state court to take a deposition should be assisted in the
discovery state. The statutes of California, Colorado, Rhode Island,
and Texas should be construed similarly.95
85. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West
1966).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); WASH. SUPER. CT.
Civ. R. 45(d)(4).
87. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974).
88. S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976).
89. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973).
90. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
91. See id § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492.
92. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; MONT. R. CIV. P. 28(d); N.J.
R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
93. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04.
94. See UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62.
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973);




B. Application for Discovery State Court Assistance in
Taking a Deposition
Assuming that the trial state proceeding for which discovery
is sought is one contemplated by the discovery state's authorizing
legislation and that a proper person is before the discovery state
court, the next issue for consideration is the procedure for apply-
ing to the discovery state court for assistance. To proceed with
interstate discovery, it is usually necessary to file an application
in the discovery state court requesting assistance in obtaining a
deposition for use in a trial state. However, three states - Iowa,
Mississippi, and New Hampshire - allow the person authorized
by the trial state court to take depositions and to issue subpoenas
without any special procedures or even the interposition of a dis-
covery state court.9 6 Most states, including those which have
enacted the uniform acts, require at least some overtures to a
court to gain assistance.97 In some situations, it may even be
necessary to obtain a commission from the trial state court before
proceeding in the discovery state.
1. General Provisions
The UFDA does not provide a procedural framework for
applying to a discovery state court, although the language of the
Act does suggest some requirements of an application. The
UFDA provides that "[w]henever any mandate, writ or commis-
sion is issued out of any [trial state] court of record .... or when-
ever upon notice or agreement it is required to take the testimony
of a witness .... witnesses may be compelled to appear."9 s As the
discovery state court possesses a vast amount of discretion under
this statute, it probably has the authority to require an applica-
tion which confirms the existence of the necessary order from the
trial state. On the other hand, since the UFDA provides that depo-
sitions for use in trial states be taken in the same manner as those
taken for use in the discovery state,99 the court may follow the nor-
mal state procedure with little variation. Quite simply, the UFDA
does not contain specific procedural application requirements.
In contrast to the UFDA, the UIIPA provides a compara-
tively detailed application procedure. Under the UIIPA, the
proper court may compel witnesses to attend a deposition "upon
the application of any interested person or in response to a letter
rogatory."' 00 The drafters of the UIIPA left each discovery state
96. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974). The Iowa statute does explicitly provide for
court enforcement of subpoenas.
97. But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966) (makes no mention of an application).
98. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62.
99. Id
100. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
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free to choose the specific courts that should receive the applica-
tion for assistance.101 Of those states which have adopted the
UIIPA, four have chosen not to limit which courts may render
assistance. 12 Conversely, the Pennsylvania version of the UIIPA
allows only a "court of record" to render assistance to a trial state
tribunal.10 3 The Michigan statute is more explicit as to which
courts may render assistance. It first provides that "[a]ny court of
record" may assist a trial state tribunal in the taking of a deposi-
tion.10 4 It then continues with the addition of a non-uniform provi-
sion: "The order [compelling testimony] shall be issued upon peti-
tion to a court of record in the county in which the deponent
resides or is employed or transacts his business in person or is
found .... ,05 Thus, in Michigan, application must be made to a
court in the proper place.
While some states have adopted the uniform acts, other states
have enacted statutes regulating the procedures for seeking
authorization to obtain interstate discovery. The New Jersey rule
is illustrative of such a provision: "Whenever the deposition of a
person is to be taken in this state pursuant to the laws of another
state, the United States, or another country for use in proceedings
there, the Superior Court may, on ex parte petition, order the issu-
ance of a subpoena .... 06 Other states having similar statutes
provide that assistance may be granted on "ex-parte petition, '" 10 7
"ex-parte application, '"108 or simply "petition.'" 0 9 Other statutes,
not modeled after the New Jersey rule, permit subpoenas to be
issued "on application of any party" 0 or merely require a
"'motion."11
A number of state statutes, following modern discovery prac-
tice, " 2 provide that a subpoena to compel the taking of a deposi-
tion will not issue unless the deposing party shows proof that
notice of the deposition was duly served upon the deponent. These
provisions appear in various forms. Idaho and Montana have rules
similar to the one found in New Jersey but with the addition of a
proof of notice requirement.11 3 Alabama, Kentucky, and Min-
101. See id § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492.
102. IND. R. TRIAL P. 28(E); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3824 (West 1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 223A, § 11 (West Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.02 (West
1980).
103. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5326 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
104. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981).
105. Id
106. N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4.
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976).
108. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
109. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
110. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981).
111. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 28(b).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2458, at 441 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 9 WRIGHT & MILLER).
113. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
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nesota offer the deposing party the option of producing either a
commission or proof of notice duly served.1 14 Utah requires that
the notice of taking of the deposition be filed with the clerk of the
court.11
The District of Columbia statute offers an interesting varia-
tion. Parties wishing to compel testimony in the District of
Columbia are provided with two options.11 6 First, the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be fol-
lowed.1 17 In this case, proof of service of a notice to take a deposi-
tion is sufficient for the issuance of a subpoena to compel
testimony.1 1 8 A party may also choose to proceed in accordance
with the rules of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
The pertinent provision of those rules requires the production of a
certified copy of either a commission or notice.'19 Thus, the proce-
dure may vary slightly depending on whether the federal district
court or the superior court is approached for assistance.
Several state provisions do not limit parties to the offering of
either a commission or proof of notice. The Illinois and Washing-
ton provisions state that when "[a]ny officer or person [is] author-
ized by the laws of another State .... to take any depositions in
this state, with or without a commission," a subpoena may be
issued.1 20 North Carolina finds sufficient the presentation of either
"a commission, order, notice, consent or other authority under
which the deposition is to be taken. ' 121 Delaware and Hawaii
require the presentation of a "verified petition" showing either a
commission, notice of deposition, or "any other proceeding that
has been taken for the purpose of taking testimony within the
State, pursuant to the laws or practice of the state.., wherein the
deposition is to be used."'1 22 Finally, New Mexico requires proof
that either "an order has been made by the court or judge in a
foreign state.., or stipulation has been entered into or a notice
given pursuant to the practice in such state." '123
Since deposition upon notice is the predominant method of
procedure,24 it should make little practical difference whether a
discovery state requires proof of notice or if some other document
i14. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04.
115. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f).
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-103 (1973).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-32, 45(d).
118. Id 45(d).
119. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28-1(b).
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); WASH. SUPER. CT.
Civ. R. 45(d)(4).
121. N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976).
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
124. This arises from the large number of states utilizing procedures similar to those
found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wright, Procedural Reform in the
States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 86-87 (1960).
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showing trial state court authorization may be produced. How-
ever, narrowly worded statutes in a few states may present diffi-
culties. For example, in Texas, judicial assistance to courts in
another state may only be granted when a "mandate, writ or com-
mission is issued."125 In Arkansas, "a commission, authorizing the
taking of such depositions, on a notice duly served" must be pro-
duced. 126 Similarly, Rhode Island and South Carolina require the
issuance of a commission by the trial state,1 27 while Colorado
requires either a commission or a dedimus potestatem. 128 Vermont
requires that the person taking a deposition must be "appointed
or commissioned by the governor or a court of record of another
state.' ' 29 The language of these statutes is reminiscent of a time
when the commission was a prevalent device in the taking of depo-
sitions. 30 Today, however, the commission is rarely used and
sometimes is not even available.' 3' Thus, the requirement of a com-
mission renders the taking of depositions in the discovery state
more difficult. These statutes should be changed to reflect current
discovery practice.
2. Special Provisions in Arizona, California, and Maine
By far the most stringent application requirements are those
found in the statutes of Arizona, California, and Maine.132 The pro-
cedures required by these states to compel testimony for use in
another state deserve to be discussed at length.
Rule 30(h) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party to an action pending in a foreign state who wishes to
take a deposition in Arizona must file an application, under oath,
as a civil action. The application must contain the following:
(a) The caption of the case and the court in which it is
pending including the names of all parties and the names
of the attorneys for the parties;
(b) References to the law of the jurisdiction in which
the action is pending which authorized the taking of the
125. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3769a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
126. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
127. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969); S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976).
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973). A dedimus potestatem is defined as "a writ or
commission issuing out of chancery, empowering the persons named therein to per-
form certain acts, as to administer oaths to defendants in chancery and take their
answers .... In the United States, a commission to take testimony was sometimes
termed a 'dedimus potestaten.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (5th ed. 1979) (cita-
tion omitted).
129. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973).
130. See Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 1, 38 COLUM.
L. REV. 1179, 1180-86 (1938).
131. See, e.g., MD. R.P. 400(b) (commission explicitly abolished); cf. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 28(a)
(depositions may be taken upon notice without a commission).




deposition in this state and such facts as, under that law,
must appear to entitle the party to take the deposition
and have a subpoena issued for the attendance of the wit-
ness;
(c) A certified copy of the notice of taking deposition,
order of the court authorizing the deposition, commission
or letters rogatory or such other pleadings as, under the
law of the foreign jurisdiction, are necessary in order to
take the deposition;
(d) A description of the notice given to other parties
and a description of the service of the application to be
made upon other parties to the action.1
33
An affidavit of service of the application must also be filed.
1 34
Subsections (c) and (d) of the rule contain provisions similar to
those of other states13 5 and are not unusual, aside from the fact
that they must be included in the lengthy affidavit. Subsection (b),
however, contains provisions that are different from those found
in most other states.1 36 Subsection (b) sets out two distinct
requirements. First, a party desiring a subpoena must state the
laws of the trial state which permit the use of an out-of-state depo-
sition. Second, the applicant must also recite any facts which the
law of the trial state would require for the issuance of a subpoena
there.
Nowhere is it suggested that a deposition taken outside the
trial state would be inadmissible at trial, while a deposition taken
in the trial state would be admissible. Subsection (b) might pre-
sent a problem, however, if no trial state statute or judicial deci-
sion explicitly touched on the use of foreign depositions. Fortu-
nately, all states have rules or statutes which either explicitly pro-
vide that depositions taken out of state may be used or detail the
procedure for taking a foreign deposition.137 Such provisions are of
two major varieties. The first type, exemplified by section 3.01 of
133. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of state provisions similar to subsection (c), concerning the docu-
ments sufficient to trigger discovery court assistance, see text accompanying notes
96-131 supra. For a discussion of notice requirements such as those embodied in
subsection (d), see text accompanying notes 168-87 infra.
136. Only California has a similar provision. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(3) (West Supp.
1981).
137. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 36-1-1 (1977); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 28(b); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 28(a); ARK.
R. Civ. P. 28(a); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2024 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. R. Civ. P.
28(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148c(b) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. SUPER. CT. R.
28(a); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-104 (1973); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.300(a); GA. CODE ANN. §
38-2103 (1974); HAWAII R. Civ. P. 28(a); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(a); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110A, § 205(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); IND. R. TRIAL P. 28(D); IOWA R. CIv. P.
153(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-227(f) (1976); Ky. R. Oiv. P. 28-02; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:3823 (West 1968); ME. R. Civ. P. 28(b); MD. R.P. 403(b); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
223A, § 10 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 304.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 28.01; MISS.
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the UIIPA,1 18 explicitly authorizes the use of foreign depositions
in the trial state. "9 The second type is modeled after rule 28(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Within the United States or within a territory or insular
possession subject to the dominion of the United States,
depositions shall be taken before an officer authorized to
administer oaths by the laws of the United States or of
the place where the examination is held, or before a person




In describing the procedure by which a deposition may be taken
out of state for use in the trial state, these provisions create a
strong inference that such a deposition is as acceptable as one
taken within the trial state.14 1 A reference to any of these statutes
would seem to satisfy the first requirement of Arizona Rule
30(h)(b).1
42
CODE ANN. § 13-1-228 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.110 (Vernon 1952); MONT.
R. Civ. P. 28(e); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1267.15 (1979); NEV. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 517:15-:17 (1974); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:12-2; N.M. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. R. 3108 (McKinney 1970); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 28(a); OHIO R.
Civ. P. 27(F); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.01 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§
45.320, .370 (1979-1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5325 (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-18-5 (1969); S.C. CODE § 19-15-10 (1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
15-6-28(a) (1967); TENN. R. Civ. P. 28.01; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3746 (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH R. Civ. P. 28(a); VT. R. Civ. P. 28(b); VA. SuP. CT. P. 28(a);
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(3); W. VA. CODE § 57-4-2 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
804.03(1) (West 1977); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 28(a). See also ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(a); DEL.
SUPER. CT. R. 45(d); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28(a), 28-1(a); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 1435 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. R. Civ. P. 28(a); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 305.3;
Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.05; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 3113(a)(2) (McKinney 1970); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 436 (West 1960); PA. R. Civ. P. 4015; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 28(a);
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(a).
138. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.01 at 487-88.
139. See, e.g., id Of those states adopting the deposition provisions of the UIIPA, four
have adopted § 3.01. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3823 (West 1968); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 10 (West Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.01
(West 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5325 (Purdon Supp. 1981). For other state
statutes explicitly authorizing foreign depositions but not based on § 3.01 of the
UIIPA, see, for example, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2024 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-227(f) (1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-5 (1969).
140. FED. R. CIv. P. 28(a). For similar state statutes, see, for example, ARiz. R. CIv. P.
28(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2103 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-228 (Supp. 1981); S.D.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-6-28(a) (1967). For state statutes not based on rule 28(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but which also set up a procedure for taking out-of-
state depositions, see, for example, ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 36-1-1 (1977); OR. REV. STAT.
§4 45.320-.370 (1979-1980); S.C. CODE § 19-15-10 (1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 3746 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
141. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(a) committee comments.
142. See also 13 H. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, DISCOVERY
PRACTICE § 424 comment at 465 (1972) (suggests that an affidavit setting forth the
opinion of a qualified expert in foreign law might be sufficient to satisfy a similar
California requirement) [hereinafter cited as GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNEI.
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The second requirement of rule 30(h)(b), that a party request-
ing discovery court assistance set out any facts that would be
required to obtain a subpoena in the trial state, is probably not
onerous. Many states allow the issuance of a subpoena upon proof
of notice of the taking of a deposition. 14 3 And a certified copy of
the notice must be attached to the application under rule 30(h) in
any event. 144 In states requiring a greater showing for the issu-
ance of a subpoena, 14 5 a statement of other facts might be
necessary.
The application must be filed as a civil action in the Arizona
Superior Court.146 Therefore, it seems that the Arizona courts
have full control over the application proceeding. This inference is
buttressed by the language of the rule, which states that "any
party or the witness may make such motions as are appropriate
under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.1' 147 However, "[n]o
further proceedings in the Superior Court . . . are required.
1 48
Thus, parties need not spend time or money continuing proceed-
ings in the Arizona courts after the deposition has been taken.
California is another state requiring an affidavit before assis-
tance in taking a deposition is granted."9 While the first para-
graph of the California provision is identical to the UFDA,15° the
statute goes on to provide:
A subpoena re deposition or a subpoena duces tecum
re deposition directed to [a] witness shall be issued by the
clerk of the superior court if it appears by affidavit filed:
(1) That the witness resides within 150 miles from the
court issuing such subpoena and from the place at which
his attendance is required;
(2) That the testimony of such witness or the
documents described in any such subpoena duces tecum
are relevant to the subject matter involved in the action
or proceeding; and
(3) That under the law of the state, territory, district
or foreign jurisdiction in which the action or proceeding is
pending, the deposition of a witness taken under such cir-
cumstances may be used in such action or proceeding.",
143. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(d); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.09(d).
144. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(c).
145. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981) (affidavit required).
146. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
147. 1&
148. 1&
149. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981).
150. Compare id with UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62.
151. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981). The requirement of subsection (1) is
the same as the one for depositions to be used in California. I& § 2019(a)(2). For a
form of an affidavit complying with § 2023, see GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, supra
note 142, § 424 at 463-65.
[Vol. 11
Interstate Deposition Statutes
Subsection (2), the relevance requirement, presents a difficult
issue concerning which state law is used to determine relevance
and is discussed more fully later."2 Nevertheless, because subsec-
tion (3) mentions that a deposition must be able to be "used"
rather than be "admissible" in the trial state, and because no
restrictions on use are stated,15 broad relevance concepts
15 4
should be applicable here. Of course, if a witness' testimony is
clearly relevant, no significant problem arises under the subsec-
tion. The third requirement of the California statute is similar to
the Arizona provision dealing with the use of a foreign deposition
in the trial state. 55 As already noted, all states have statutes
touching on this subject1 56 and, thus, the use of a foreign deposi-
tion in a trial state should not be seriously questioned. 157 Accord-
ingly, this final California requirement should be easily met.
Maine is the last of the three states with statutes that set out
detailed application procedures.158 As in Arizona, the application
for a subpoena in Maine is docketed as a civil action, giving the
Maine courts firm control over the discovery process. 15 9 The appli-
cation must contain the following information:
(i) The name and location of the court in which the
action or proceeding is pending.
(ii) The title and docket or other identifying number of
the action or proceeding in the court where pending.
(iii) A brief statement of the nature of the action or
proceeding and the provisions of the laws of the jurisdic-
tion where the action or proceeding is pending which
authorize the deposition.
(iv) The time and place for taking each deposition.
(v) The name and address of each person to be exam-
ined, if known, and if the name is not known a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular
class or group to which he belongs.
(vi) If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served, a desig-
nation of the materials to be produced.
152. See notes 300-21 and accompanying text infra.
153. GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 142, § 416 at 455 n.46; see CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 2023(2) (West Supp. 1981).
154. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (allows discovery of evidence which may not be
admissible at trial but which may lead to admissible evidence).
155. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(3) (West Supp. 1981) with ARIz. R. Civ. P.
30(h)(b).
156. For a compilation of these statutes, see note 137 supra.
157. Even without the statutory references, an affidavit setting forth the opinion of a
qualified expert in foreign law should be sufficient to show that a deposition may be
used in a forum state. GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 142, § 424 comment at
465.
158. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
159. I& 30(h)(2)(i). Compare i& with ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
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(vii) A statement that timely and adequate notice of
the taking has been given to all opposing parties either in
the manner required by the laws of the jurisdiction where
the action or proceeding is pending or in the manner pro-
vided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of this rule.1
60
Like the Arizona rule and the California statute, the Maine rule re-
quires a statement of the trial state law that authorizes the use of
a foreign deposition.'6 1 A brief statement of the nature of the
action is also required. 6 2 Other requirements, such as the time and
place for the taking of the deposition6 3 and the name and address
of the deponent,164 are largely administrative in nature and are
easily complied with.
The Maine rule contains one provision unique among all
states. Rule 30(h) states that "[t]he application shall be signed by
a member of the bar of this state.' ' 6 Thus, local counsel must be
obtained to take a deposition in Maine. Ostensibly, the purpose of
this is to prevent fraud, since counsel's signature acts as a certifi-
cation of the truth of the application. 66 However, the provision is
an unfortunate additional burden on the person seeking discovery,
especially where no other state has deemed it necessary to do
likewise.
6 7
C. Notice of Deposition
State interstate deposition statutes may also require that
notice of the deposition be provided to all parties. Although the
deposition process ordinarily requires notice to all parties,6 8 some
interstate deposition statutes provide explicitly for the issuance
of a subpoena after ex parte proceedings. 6 9 On the other hand,
160. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(3).
161. Id 30(h)(3)(iii). Compare id with ARiz. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(b) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
2023(3) (West Supp. 1981). It is possible that this Maine provision might be con-
strued to require a determination under the laws of the trial state whether the deposi-
tion is relevant.





166. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (signing of pleadings).
167. Arizona and California both require the application to be under oath, thus preventing
fraud, but do not require that local counsel sign the application. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981).
168. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-228(d) (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981) (non-uniform addition
to UIIPA); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
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some states make proof of notice a prerequisite for the issuance of
a subpoena. 7 '
Four states have interstate deposition statutes that authorize
a court to act ex parte when issuing a subpoena to compel attend-
ance at a deposition to be used in another state. The Kansas and
Missouri statutes merely state that the court may act on an ex
parte petition.1 7' The Illinois statute is slightly different: "The
court may hear and act upon the petition with or without notice as
the court directs.' ' 72 Similarly, the Michigan statute, adding a
non-uniform provision to the UIIPA, gives the court discretion to
require notice or act ex parte. 1"
In contrast, a few states specifically require notice to all par-
ties. In Arizona, an affidavit of service of the application for a sub-
poena must be submitted with the application.11 Maine requires
that the application itself contain a statement "that timely and
adequate notice of the taking has been given to all opposing par-
ties."'' 7 6 Other state statutes simply provide that proof of duly
served notice is required.17 6 Although this form of statute leaves
room for some ambiguity,177 it probably requires that notice be
sent to all parties that a subpoena is being sought outside the trial
state.
Most state statutes do not explicitly require notice; however,
from the language of these statutes, inferences may be drawn that
notice is required. The majority of statutes that are silent on the
170. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); ME. R. Civ. P.
30(h)(3)(vii); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; MONT. R. CIv. P. 28(d); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f); cf
ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b) (either proof of notice or a commission required); KY. R. Civ. P.
28.03 (same).
171. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d)(1976); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
172. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
173. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981). Compare id with UIIPA, supra note
4, § 3.02 at 492.
174. ARIM. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
175. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(3)(vii). Notice may be sent in accordance with either the proce-
dure in the trial state or Maine procedure Id
176. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; MONT. R. Civ. P.
28(d); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f).
177. For example, questions concerning to whom notice is required and the procedure to
be followed for providing notice are left unanswered.
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notice requirement may be described as "same manner"
statutes. 7 8 These statutes provide that depositions for use out of
state should be taken in the same manner as depositions for use
within the discovery state. Since many states require notice for
the taking of a deposition to be used in the state,17 9 notice will also
be necessary for depositions to be used out of the state.8 0 Addi-
tionally, discovery state procedure usually provides for attack on
the issuance of the subpoena by interested persons.'8" While it is
important to consult discovery state procedure in a state which
has a like manner statute, the general rule is that notice is re-
quired.
Other state statutes are similar to same manner provisions in
that they follow discovery state procedure to a certain extent
when dealing with depositions to be used out of state. Unlike same
manner provisions, however, these statutes explicitly refer to the
portions of the discovery state rules that apply. 8 2 To the extent
that the discovery state statutes or rules referred to require
notice, notice is necessary for a deposition to be used in the trial
state.
The UIIPA does not specifically require notice to any party,
but the Act does note that the order requiring testimony
178. "Same manner" statutes are those which require that depositions to be taken in the
discovery state for use in the trial state be taken in the same manner as depositions
to be used in the discovery state. A good example of a same manner statute is the
UFDA. See UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62. For a compilation of those states in
which the UFDA is presently in force, see note 15 supra.
Other state statutes clearly fall into the same manner category. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3769a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); UTAH R. Civ. P.
26(f); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973); cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West
Supp. 1981) (same manner statute as to everything but the application procedure).
It is unclear whether a few statutes fall into the same manner category for all
purposes, since these statutes provide that only obedience to a subpoena may be en-
forced in like manner. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
4311 (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982).
Finally, the District of Columbia statute is at least partially a same manner pro-
vision. Parties may proceed "in like manner and with like effect as other depositions
are taken in United States district courts," Le., by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, or parties may proceed by the rules of the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-103 (1973). The superior court rules have a special
provision relating to depositions to be used in other jurisdictions. D.C. SUPER. CT. R.
Civ. P. 28-1(b).
179. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(1); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
180. Note, however, that this notice will not necessarily inform parties of an intention to
seek out-of-trial-state process. Since a party may want to challenge a deposition sub-
poena in the discovery state, the notice and applicable discovery state laws should be
scrutinized to determine from which court such a subpoena would issue.
181. In many states, this may be done by means of a motion for a protective order. See,
e.g., MD. R.P. 406; MINN. R. Civ. P. 30.04.
182. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; N.J. R. CIV. PRAC.
4:11-4; N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
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may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be
wholly or in part the practice and procedure of the tri-
bunal outside this state .... To the extent that the order
does not prescribe otherwise, the practice and procedure
shall be in accordance with that of the court of this state
issuing the order.
183
Thus, under the UIIPA, notice requirements may be ordered by
the discovery state court. If they are not, procedure under the
UIIPA would be analogous to that under a same manner statute.
In the remaining states, notice is not mentioned and it is
impossible to derive from the language of the statutes what the
discovery state courts might require. 84 Of course, where the
court's power to issue a subpoena is discretionary,185 it may in any
case require notice to parties or other persons as a prerequisite to
the exercise of its discretion.
It seems clear that the better procedure requires notice to all
parties that an out-of-state subpoena to compel discovery is being
sought. First, this may save the expense of an out-of-state pro-
ceeding entirely, since a recalcitrant deponent may relent once he
realizes that he cannot escape process.'8 6 Second, this procedure
provides opposing parties an opportunity to challenge the rele-
vance of the out-of-state testimony or the necessity of the expense
required to take an out-of-state deposition. Finally, giving notice
is an inexpensive courtesy to opposing parties.
In any event, few situations exist where an opposing party
would not receive notice of an application or petition for the issu-
ance of a subpoena to compel testimony outside the trial state.
Almost all states require some type of notice of the taking of the
deposition itself. Additionally, lack of notice of a petition for a for-
eign subpoena will not prevent an opposing party from participat-
ing in the questioning.187 But because notice to parties of an inten-
tion to proceed in a foreign court requires so little effort, ex parte
proceedings should be discouraged.
D. Location Limitations
Other procedural requirements found in many states concern
the location where the deponent may be served and where he may
183. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
184. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-18-11 (1969); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West
1966).
185. See notes 229-66 and accompanying text infra.
186. Cf UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02(b) at 492 (voluntary testimony provision).
187. If notice is not given and a party is not present or represented at the taking of the




be deposed. These location limitations are not confined to deposi-
tions taken for use in another state.188 They are closely intertwined
with the venue requirements placed on state courts by a wide
variety of statutes. 89 These jurisdictional limitations, though
usually not found in an interstate deposition statute,10 apply to
all service of process within the state. Thus, unless an interstate
deposition statute mentions limits placed on either the place of
service or the place of deposition, it must be assumed that limits
are placed on the subpoena power by other discovery state
statutes or rules. These statutes or rules must be consulted in
order to ascertain which location limitations are applicable.
In those states having same manner statutes, 91 including the
states that have adopted the UFDA, location limitations found
outside the interstate deposition provision are applicable to depo-
sitions taken for use in another jurisdiction. This conclusion
follows from the language of those provisions, which states that
depositions for use in another state may be taken and subpoenas
issued "in the same manner and by the same process and proceed-
ing" as depositions taken for use in the discovdry state. 92 Other
states have rules which provide that subpoenas may be issued
pursuant to a particular procedural rule.'9 3 Therefore, careful
scrutiny of discovery state procedure is required to determine the
jurisdictional limits that apply.
Some states have location limitations included in their inter-
state deposition statutes. These usually relate either to the court
to which application must be made' 94 or to the place where the
deposition may be taken.' 95 The language of each statute differs,
and these statutes must be discussed separately to ensure proper
practice.
188. E.g., MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(1) (West Supp. 1981)
(requiring deponents for depositions for use in foreign state to reside within 150 miles
of court and place of deposition).
189. Venue requirements are intended for the convenience of the parties and may easily be
waived. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 42, at 169-70 (3d ed. 1976). Whether similar location requirements for depo-
sitions may be disregarded by the parties is an open question.
190. Perhaps this is because rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Procedure, on which many
state statutes are based, does not contain any reference to foreign depositions. FED.
R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). But see MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04 (based on rule 45 and containing
interstate deposition provision).
191. See note 178 supra.
192. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62; see statutes cited note 15 supra.
193. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d). See also
IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
194. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME.
R. Civ. P. 30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R.
45(d)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(1) (West Supp. 1981); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
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Of those states which have a provision limiting the courts to
which application for a subpoena may be made, Illinois uses the
broadest language. A party desiring to depose a witness in Illinois
has the option of petitioning the circuit court in the county in
which the deponent either "resides or is employed or transacts his
business in person or is found.' 1 96 Similarly, Missouri allows the
circuit court in the county where the deponent is found to issue a
subpoena, 197 and Arkansas requires a commission to be produced
"to a judge of the circuit, chancery or probate court in the county
where the witness... resides or may be found." 98 In any of these
states, therefore, a subpoena might issue from one of several
courts. Three other states offer choices almost as wide as those
offered by Illinois. These statutes provide that the out-of-state
party must deal with the court in the county where "the deponent
resides or is employed or transacts his business in person."'
' 99
Although not offering the broadest option of dealing with the
court where the deponent may be found, these statutes are liberal
with respect to the courts which may issue a subpoena. A few
states view only the residence of the witness as dispositive.
Alabama requires that the commission authorizing the deposition
be produced "to a judge of the circuit where the witness
resides. '20 0 The Kentucky provision similarly states that the com-
mission be produced before a judge in the district where the wit-
ness resides. 20 1 Both Idaho and Montana have rules providing that
subpoenas may issue from the court in the county where the wit-
ness is to be served.20 2 A similar rule is found in Utah: It requires
that a notice of deposition be filed with the court in the county
where the witness either resides or is to be served. 20 These rules
therefore require an examination of the discovery state procedure
to determine the limits on service before the proper court may be
selected.
A few states also have provisions limiting the places where
the deponent may be required to testify. The California provision
requires that the deponent reside within 150 miles of the court
issuing the subpoena and within 150 miles of the place where the
deposition is to be taken.0 4 The Minnesota rule provides: "A resi-
dent of this state may be required to attend an examination only
196. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
197. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
198. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
199. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
200. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
201. Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03.
202. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
203. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f).
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(1) (West Supp. 1981). This requirement is the same as
the one for depositions to be used in California. Id § 2019(a)(2).
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in the county wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his
business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by
an order of court. 2 5 This provision, although limiting the places
where depositions may be taken, also allows the court a large
measure of discretion. The New Mexico provision is more limited,
in stating that "no witness shall be compelled to attend outside
the judicial district in which he shall reside, or sojourn.
20 6
Notwithstanding jurisdictional limitations found elsewhere,
some interstate deposition statutes place few limits on the place of
deposition, the place the witness must be served, or the court
which must act. The Rhode Island statute, for example, merely
provides that depositions may be taken "before any person resid-
ing in this state. '"2 7 Wisconsin has a similar provision. 20 8 The Col-
orado statute gives the district court "of the county where the
party holding the commission resides" the power to issue sub-
poenas, thus looking more towards the convenience of the com-
missioner than of the deponent.20 9 Perhaps the widest latitude is
given by the Mississippi statute. It allows any person appointed
by any court "without the limits of [the] state" to issue subpoenas
"returnable at such time and place" as the appointee chooses.210
On its face, this statute allows the deposing party broad dis-
cretion in service of the subpoena and place of taking the deposi-
tion. Whether it is as broad in practice as its language suggests is
an open question.211 The language of both the Arizona and South
Carolina provisions implies that any judge of the proper court
may receive an application, and then the necessary subpoena will
issue from the clerk's office nearest the place of taking the deposi-
tion.212 In practice, it would be wise to approach the court issuing
the subpoena in order to avoid problems and delay.
The provisions of the UIIPA strike a middle ground between
those states which have strict limitations and those which have
none. The UIIPA merely provides that "[a] court of this state may
order a person who is domiciled or is found within this state to
give his testimony.""21 This implies that statewide service of proc-
ess may issue from any state court for the taking of a deposition
to be used in another state. It also implies that a deposed indi-
vidual may be required to give his testimony anywhere within the
205. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04. Compare id with FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2). By its own terms,
this Minnesota rule also applies to depositions taken for use in Minnesota.
206. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
207. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969).
208. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
209. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973).
210. MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972).
211. Cf. id § 13-1-226(c) (Supp. 1980) (protective orders).
212. AiZ. R. Civ. P. 39(h); S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976).
213. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
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discovery state. It is unlikely, though, that a court would exceed
any jurisdictional boundaries imposed by other state statutes.
1 4
Moreover, since courts have a large amount of discretion under
the UIIPA,1 5 a deponent may be protected from traveling great
distances. Thus, although the UIIPA is flexible, other state
statutes must be examined for possible restrictions.
E. Witness Fees for Deponents
Four states have provisions dealing with witness fees in their
interstate deposition statutes. As most states have other statutes
dealing with witness fees,216 payment of witness fees is probably
also required in states whose interstate deposition statutes are
silent on the subject.2"7 This is especially true in states having a
same manner provision.21
The Delaware statute provides that a subpoena may not be
enforced unless the witness has been tendered "the legal witness
fees, including mileage, as provided for attendance before the
Superior Court."2 19 Similarly, the New Mexico statute states that
"no witness shall be compelled to attend... unless ... [he] is paid
witness fees and mileage in the same manner as are required upon
the service of a subpoena in a cause pending in the district
court." 220 The Tennessee statute simply provides that a witness is
entitled to the same fees as a witness in the circuit court.221 Since
each state also provides elsewhere that witnesses are entitled to
fees,2 22 these statutes do not operate as a special requirement for
persons seeking depositions for use out of state.
The North Carolina rule takes a different tack. Under this
rule, a person appointed as a commissioner to take a deposition
may not act under his appointment
214. See notes 188-93 and accompanying text supra. The Washington rule makes this
explicit, in providing that a judge or justice of the peace may issue a subpoena "for
attendance at any places within his jurisdiction." WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4).
215. See notes 230-35 and accompanying text infra.
216. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.5 (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.14 (West
Supp. 1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-202 (1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2335.06 (Page Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.40.010 (Supp. 1981).
217. Another question is whether deponents are "witnesses" and therefore entitled to fees
under the fee statutes. Some statutes explicitly provide for this. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A, § 208(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.010
(Baldwin 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-2-507 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-29-7 (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1551 (1981). Others, however, are not so clear. E.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 33-139 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.410 (1979-1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 21-5-4 (1976).
218. See note 178 supra.
219. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).
220. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
221. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-103 (1980). That portion of the Tennessee statute dealing
with witness fees is a non-uniform addition to the UFDA. Compare id with UFDA,
supra note 13, § 1 at 62.
222. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8903 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-8 (1978); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-4-101 (1980).
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until the party seeking to obtain such deposition has
deposited with him a sufficient sum of money to cover all
costs and charges incident to the taking of the deposition,
including... witness fees .... From such deposit the com-
missioner shall retain whatever amount may be due him
for services, pay the witness fees and other costs that
may have been incurred by reason of taking such deposi-
tion .... 223
No similar requirement of deposit is imposed on those wishing to
take a deposition for use within North Carolina 224 and, thus, this
provision adds an unnecessary administrative burden to the tak-
ing of a deposition for use out of the state. Also, it is unwise to
allow the commissioner to set the "sufficient" sum of money with-
out some type of guidelines. Nevertheless, as costs must be paid
in any event, the advance deposit requirement should not prove to
be an undue burden.
F. Reciprocity Requirement of Wisconsin
Wisconsin has a requirement unique among all of the states.
Subpoenas may be issued to compel testimony for a deposition to
be used in another state "provided, its laws contain provisions
similar to this section, requiring persons within its borders to give
their testimony by deposition in actions pending in Wisconsin." 221
Since all states have interstate deposition provisions, 226 the Wis-
consin reciprocity requirement would seem to be but a small hur-
dle. Although no litigation has arisen on this point, the Wisconsin
proviso might be a problem if a court were to interpret the strict
requirements imposed by, for instance, the Arizona 227 or Maine228
rules as making them not "similar" and thus not reciprocal. Such
an interpretation would be inconsistent with the purpose of the
Wisconsin statute and, thus, would be unjustified.
IV. ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS
Once the procedural hurdles have been overcome, the next
important issue is whether the discovery state court is required to
issue process upon the filing of a proper application or whether the
court may exercise its discretion in determining whether or not to
facilitate discovery. Allowing a court discretion in deciding
whether or not to compel testimony may provide another battle-
ground for a person opposing the deposition. Mandatory actioi,
223. N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
224. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-55 (1969) (fees for witnesses at depositions used in state).
225. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
226. For a compilation of these provisions, see note 12 supra.
227. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
228. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
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on the other hand, is desirable by those wishing to depose persons
found outside the trial state. Not surprisingly, the interstate depo-
sition statutes differ. Although some statutes clearly use discre-
tionary language, others use terms most often described as "di-
rectory."229
Both the UFDA and the UIIPA give a court discretion to
compel appearance. 230 The UFDA provides that "witnesses may
be compelled to appear and testify." 23' Likewise, the UIIPA states
that "[al court... may order a person.., to give his testimony, "232
and the Commissioners' Comment makes it clear that mandatory
action is not required: "The court ... retains complete discretion
to frame an appropriate order. In exercising this power, the court
may take into account the nature and attitudes of the requesting
government and the character of the proceedings. ' 233 In addition,
"[t]he court has complete discretion to prescribe the procedure to
be followed. '234 Thus, in those states having one of the uniform
acts, issuance of a subpoena to compel attendance at a deposition
to be used in another state is completely within the court's con-
trol.
235
Another group of states, although not adopting either the
UFDA or the UIIPA, have similar provisions which grant their
courts discretion in issuing subpoenas to compel attendance at a
deposition.2 6 These statutes provide that the appropriate court
may issue or order the issuance of subpoenas as provided in the
state rules of civil procedure.237 Other states, having provisions
that differ considerably, also allow their courts discretion when
asked to assist a foreign tribunal. For example, the Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Maine, and Rhode Island provisions state
229. See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 57.01-.26
(4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SANDS].
230. See UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62; UIIPA, supra note 4. § 3.02 at 492.
231. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62 (emphasis added). For the full text of § 1 of the
UFDA, see text accompanying note 16 supra. "May" is usually considered to be
discretionary language. SANDS, supra note 229, § 57.03 at 416.
232. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492 (emphasis added). For the full text of § 3.02(a) of
the UlIPA, see text accompanying note 18 supra.
233. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492.
234. Id
235. The New York provision also falls within this category. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e)
(McKinney 1970).
236. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28je); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976);
Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; W. VA. R. Civ.
P. 28(d). See also 2 R. DEL DEO, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, COURT RULES ANNOTATED
170-71 (3d ed. 1973).
237. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976);




that depositions or testimony for use in another state "may be
taken. ' 238 Colorado, Illinois, Washington, and Wisconsin have
statutes simply providing for the discretionary issuance of sub-
poenas.2 39 None of the provisions contain any particular interpre-
tive problems, and the discretionary nature of the power is clear.
Outside the realm of statutes that are clearly discretionary, it
is often difficult to determine whether a court has a choice to act.
The statutes of three states - California, Michigan, and Hawaii -
contain certain language which is ambiguous on its face.2"" Yet, in
each case, the ambiguity would probably be resolved in favor of
granting a court discretion to act.
Although the UFDA constitutes the first paragraph of the
California statute, a lengthy affidavit requirement is also added.2 '
While the UFDA is couched in discretionary terms, the California
statute additionally provides that if the affidavit establishes the
necessary facts, "[a] subpoena ... shall be issued by the clerk of
the superior court.' '242 Thus, an interpretation of the statute as
mandatory would not be unreasonable, although the better view is
that the California statute provides for discretionary issuance.2 43
Another ambiguity created by a state's addition to a uniform
act is present in the Michigan statute. Michigan has generally
adopted section 3.02 of the UIIPA. After the UTIPA language that
"[alny court of record of this state may order a person to give his
testimony," however, the Michigan provision adds: "The order
shall be issued upon petition to a court of record in the county in
which the deponent resides or is employed or transacts his busi-
ness in person or is found for a subpoena to compel the giving of
testimony by him. ' 244 This location requirement does not change
238. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148ef) (West Supp. 1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-103
(1973); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969). As to the District of
Columbia, see also FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28-4(b).
239. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-1982); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West
1966).
240. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981). It is interesting to note that ambigui-
ties in two of these statutes arise from additions to uniform acts. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981) (affidavit requirement added to UFDA); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981) (location requirement added to UIIPA).
241. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); see notes 150-51 and accompanying
text supra.
242. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981).
243. GROSSMAN & VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 142, § 416 at 454, 456. "Shall" is probably
used here in the indicative rather than the imperative sense. See Driedger,
Legislative Drafting, 27 CAN. B. REV. 291, 303-04 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Driedger]. Directory language may be overcome by other considerations. SANDS,
supra note 229, § 57.03 at 415.
244. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981).
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the main thrust of the UIIPA, which grants courts a large amount
of discretion. 4 5 The use of the mandatory "shall" in the second
sentence probably is the result of careless draftsmanship,246
because the discretionary language in the UIIPA was not altered
by the Michigan legislature. In addition, the legislature was pre-
sented with the Commissioners' Comment to section 3.02 of the
UIIPA, which clearly delineates the discretion granted to the
court.247 Therefore, the Michigan statute should be interpreted as
giving the court discretion to act.
The last of the ambiguous provisions, that of Hawaii, states
as follows:
Where a commission to take testimony within the State
has been issued from a court without the State, or where a
notice has been given or any other proceeding has been
taken for the purpose of taking testimony within the
State .... the circuit court, in a proper case, on the presen-
tation of a verified petition shall order the issuance of a
subpoena .... 248
The mandatory "shall" in the section indicates that the court
must issue a subpoena when a verified petition is presented, but
the words "in a proper case" point to the use of judicial discretion
in the issuance of subpoenas. Again, while sloppy draftsmanship
may to a limited extent indicate lack of discretion,249 the Hawaii
statute should be interpreted so as to afford a court discretion in
assisting a foreign tribunal.
Even when statutory language is unambiguously directory on
its face, questions may arise as to whether discretion is allowed.
Although the Delaware statute states that "the Prothonotary of
the Superior Court ... shall issue a subpoena" upon the presenta-
tion of a verified petition,250 a Delaware court has held that a court
has discretion to quash the issuance of a subpoena issued under
the statute. 251 In In re Denning,2 2 parties requesting a subpoena
had complied with all of the provisions of the Delaware foreign
deposition statute.2 53 When the deponent moved to quash the sub-
245. See text accompanying notes 230-35 supra.
246. The use of "shall" in the indicative rather than the imperative sense is generally con-
sidered to be poor draftsmanship. See Driedger, supra note 243, at 303-04.
247. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.1852(2) practice commentary 1968 (1981). See also
UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 commissioners' comment at 492-93.
248. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976) (emphasis added).
249. See note 246 supra.
250. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).
251. In re Denning, 44 DeL 470, 61 A.2d 657 (1948).
252. 44 Del. 470, 61 A.2d 657 (1948).
253. Id at 472, 61 A.2d at 658.
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poena, the petitioners argued that the court had no power to act.
The court responded by saying:
A Court always has inherent power over its own process
and, in a proper case, may vacate or quash writs, returns,
or other process incorrectly or improvidently issued. Here
the right to take the depositions of the very witness
sought to be examined is challenged. Surely this Court is
not without power to determine the fundamental question
involved .... 254
The rationale of the court in Denning is applicable to other provi-
sions couched in mandatory language. For example, the Arizona
rule has language directing the clerk to issue subpoenas. 255 The
Minnesota rule states that "[piroof of service of notice to take a
deposition as provided in... a state where the action is pending
constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance of sub-
poenas.''5 The Utah provision is similar to that of Minnesota.6 7
Under these rules, the clerk of the court issues subpoenas as a
matter of course, without judicial intervention.258 But Denning
indicates that a court has the power to block the issuance of sub-
poenas, or quash them if already issued, even when all the statu-
tory prerequisites are met.
259
Another group of states has provisions granting the commis-
sioner or other person appointed to take the deposition the power
to issue subpoenas.260 Although these rules do not provide for
mandatory issuance in the same manner as the statutes discussed
above, i.e., by directing the issuance of a subpoena, it must be
assumed that the person appointed to take a deposition will use
subpoenas if necessary. Again, however, a court in the discovery
state would have authority to entertain a motion to quash.2 6
1
Two statutes make explicit what is implicit in all the statutes
containing mandatory language - proper proof of facts is neces-
sary for the issuance of subpoenas. The New Mexico statute pro-
vides:
Where an order has been made by the court or a judge in a
foreign state, territory or country, or stipulation has been
entered into, or a notice given pursuant to the practice in
254. Id
255. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
256. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04.
257. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(f); see id 45(d). The Utah rule also requires that proof of notice be
filed with the clerk. Id. 26(f).
258. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 112, § 2453 at 424.
259. 44 Del. 470, 472, 61 A.2d 657, 658 (1948).
260. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d). The Arkansas rule,
although of slightly different language, has the same effect. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
261. In re Denning, 44 Del. 470, 472, 61 A.2d 657, 658 (1948).
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such state, territory or country for the taking of the depo-
sition of a witness within this state for use in a legal pro-
ceeding "or cause pending" in such state, territory or
country, any judge shal upon proof of such facts, issue
an order directing the witness ... to attend.26
2
Similarly, the South Carolina statute requires a person obtaining
a commission to produce it to a judge "who, on being satisfied of
its authenticity and regularity, shall direct a subpoena to issue in
due form from the clerk's office of the nearest circuit court. ' 263 In
both of these states, judges have a certain amount of discretion in
deciding whether facts are "proven" or a commission is "regular."
This adds little to a court's power, however, since there is little
doubt that a court could protect itself against fraud without these
statutory directives.6 4
Four states provide that a party desiring to take a deposition
may produce either a commission or notice of deposition, where-
upon it shall be the duty of the judge to issue the necessary sub-
poenas. 265 This language is more directory than most, and a com-
pelling argument can be made that the court must act if the proce-
dural requirements are met. Yet this argument is outweighed by a
court's "inherent power over its own process" and even this direc-
tory language would probably fall in the face of that power.266
V. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Inevitably, when proceedings are bifurcated between two
state forums, conflicts of laws arise. In the area of interstate depo-
sitions, conflicts arise in four main areas: first, in the choice of pro-
cedure to be followed in taking the deposition; second, in deciding
questions of relevance; third, in deciding questions of privilege;
and finally, in the protection of the deponent.
A. Choice of Procedure to be Followed in Taking Depositions
Discovery is in large measure procedural and, thus, questions
may arise during the course of a deposition regarding the manner
of taking the examination. For example, questions may arise con-
cerning whether videotaping is an appropriate transcription or
how objections should be noted. When a deposition is being taken
262. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978) (emphasis added).
263. S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976).
264. Nor could it be seriously argued that a clerk must accept a totally irregular or
patently false application and issue a subpoena based on it.
265. IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1248 (1973).
266. In re Denning, 44 Del. 470, 472, 61 A.2d 657, 658 (1948).
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in one state for use in another state, the issue becomes which state
procedure governs the taking of the deposition.2 67 Unfortunately,
few interstate deposition statutes touch directly on this subject.
The general rule is that the procedure of the forum state, in
this case the discovery state, is followed.2 68 However, this rule is
not tailored to the situation in which a deposition is to be taken in
one state for use in another state. Rather, it is usually applied
when a deposition is being taken in one state for use in its trial
court and the substantive law of another state is to be applied at
trial. Since no general rule is directly applicable to the interstate
deposition situation, the language of the various statutes must be
examined.
The UIIPA contains the most detailed and reasonable provi-
sion with respect to the procedure to be used. It states that the
order compelling testimony
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be
wholly or in part the practice and procedure of the tri-
bunal outside this state, for taking the testimony.... To
the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the
practice and procedure shall be in accordance with that of
the court of this state issuing the order.2"9
Thus, the UIIPA provides for flexibility in detailing the procedure
for taking depositions in the discovery state that are to be used in
the trial state.
In states that have adopted the UIIPA, the discovery state
court may allow a deposition to be taken as if it were being taken
in the trial state.270 This is a very sensible procedure. The parties
are familiar with the practice of the trial state. Therefore, extra
expense is avoided if they do not have to spend a great amount of
time familiarizing themselves with the law of the discovery state.
Also, the trial state has an interest in seeing that its discovery
procedure is followed because its law will ultimately determine the
use to which the deposition will be put.
27 1
Under the UIIPA, the discovery state court is also permitted
to retain the procedures of the discovery state. This has obvious
267. The issue of choice of law, principally arising in the areas of relevance and privilege, is
a separate subject, although related to choice of procedure.
268. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENTI. Comment a to §127 states that "[tihe local law of the forum governs
... pre-trial practice, including the taking and use of depositions, discovery and
penalties for refusal to comply with proper request for information."
269. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
270. This may be particularly important if the deposition is taken under a protective order
issued by the trial state because, in this situation, the trial state has already made a
determination that some aspects of the deposition must be performed in a certain
manner.
271. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
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advantages in certain situations, particularly where the deponent,
rather than a party, is making objections to the deposition,
272
since the discovery state has an interest in protecting its own
domiciliary. 273 Following discovery state procedures may also
make the process easier to administer.27 4 Since the deposition is
taken in the discovery state, there is little reason to follow the trial
state rules regarding the distance a witness may be required to
travel or the fees to be paid to him.275 Sufficient flexibility is pro-
vided under the UIIPA so that these competing interests may be
properly balanced.
While the UIIPA provides that the discovery state procedure
will be followed absent a contrary prescription in the order com-
pelling testimony, in Rhode Island, these presumptions are
reversed. The Rhode Island statute provides that the commission
issued by the trial state authorizing the deposition may prescribe
the "formalities" to be followed; otherwise, the deposition is taken
"according to the laws of the jurisdiction whence said commission
issues. ' 27 6 In Rhode Island, then, the court in the discovery state
acts merely as an extension of the trial state court.
One group of states has rules providing that "[wihenever the
deposition of any person is to be taken in this state pursuant to
the laws of another state or of the United States or of another
country for use in proceedings there," the proper subpoenas may
be issued.277 This language may be interpreted in two ways. First,
the rules may direct that depositions to be used in another state
must be taken in accordance with the laws of the trial state. On
the other hand, "pursuant to the laws of another state" could
mean merely that the trial state must have a statute authorizing
the use of an out-of-state deposition. Other provisions of these
rules shed little light on this ambiguity, although applying the
general rule that the procedure of the forum state should govern
resolves the ambiguity in favor of the discovery state.278
Other statutes, although having similar wording, contain
additional language that provides insights into the procedure to
be followed. The Hawaii statute states that
[w]here a commission . . .has been issued from a court




275. Some states have covered these areas within their interstate deposition statutes. See
notes 204-06, 216-24 and accompanying text supra
276. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969).
277. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. Civ.
PRAC. 4:11-4; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
278. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 127.
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the State... wherein the deposition is to be used... the
circuit court.., shall order the issuance of a subpoena to
any witness commanding him... to testify in the same
manner as is provided by the rules of court relating to
depositions for use in State.279
Thus, the Hawaii statute is of the same manner type.280 In addi-
tion to the "pursuant to" language, the Missouri rule provides
that the court "in aid of the taking of the deposition, and having
due regard for the laws and rules of [the trial state], may make
such orders as could be made if the deposition were intended for
use in this jurisdiction. "21 Although this language relates to pro-
tective orders,2 2 it also indicates that a Missouri court may apply
its own procedure in taking depositions to be used out of state.
The procedure of the trial state, however, must at least be taken
into account. The Kansas statute, which describes the types of
orders that a court may make, is similar.2 83 It indicates that Kan-
sas procedure should be followed at least to a certain extent. The
Delaware statute is another that details the Delaware procedure
that should be followed. 2 4 Although the Maine rule begins by stat-
ing that "[t]he deposition of any person may be taken in this state
upon oral examination pursuant to the laws of another state,
28 5
its main thrust indicates that Maine procedure is to be followed.
First, it details those protective orders which may be issued by
the court pursuant to the Maine rule.28 6 More importantly, the
Maine rule provides that the necessary application for a subpoena
be docketed as a civil action, thus indicating that this is more than
a minimal contact with the Maine court and that the usual proce-
dure should apply.2 7 The Maine rule does provide, though, for
notice to be given in accordance with the procedure of the trial
state.28 8 Arizona is another state that requires the application for a
subpoena to be filed as a civil action. Arizona procedure is clearly
contemplated by the language of the discovery provision, which
states that "any party or the witness may make such motions as
are appropriate under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 289
In those states having same manner statutes, 290 the wording of
the provisions supports the inference that the procedure of the
279. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976).
280. See note 178 supra.
281. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
282. See text accompanying notes 339, 344 infra.
283. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976).
284. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).




289. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
290. See note 178 supra.
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discovery state should be followed when taking a deposition.29'
Unlike the statutes that speak in terms of depositions to be taken
pursuant to the laws of another state, the UFDA provides that
where a commission is issued by a trial state court, depositions
will be taken "by the same process and proceeding as may be
employed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings
pending in this state. '292 States that have adopted the UFDA,2 93
therefore, clearly maintain their own procedure and do not act as a
mere extension of the trial state court.294 The same result is neces-
sary for other same manner provisions.295
The remaining state interstate deposition statutes do not indi-
cate which state's procedure for the taking of depositions should
be followed.2 96 The fact that a majority of these provisions are con-
tained within the state rules of civil procedure offers an inference
that the discovery state practice prevails. 29 7 On the other hand, a
few of these provisions set out such detailed procedures dealing
with contempt, witness fees, and protective orders that one might
suggest that a special procedure, one dealing specifically with
depositions to be used in a foreign state, be followed. 298 The de-
tailed procedures, however, track the practice normally followed
in the discovery court, and presumably discovery state procedure
would be followed. In the absence of any language indicating
otherwise, the general rule that discovery state procedure is to be
followed must be looked to for guidance.299
B. Law Governing Questions of Relevance
Questions of relevance may arise in two procedural settings.
Relevance considerations may arise first in the trial state court.
00
291. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
292. UFDA, supra note 13, § 1 at 62.
293. For a compilation of these states, see note 15 supra.
294. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
295. The Utah provision buttresses this position. It states that "all matters arising dur-
ing the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to
the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being
taken." UTAH R. Civ. P. 27(f).
296. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d);
WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
297. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); N.C. R. CIv. P. 28(d); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 45(d)(4);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
298. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-8-1 to -3 (1978); N.C. R. CIV. P.
28(d).
299. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 127.
300. See Reese & Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges and Conflict of Laws, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977. at 85, 99 [hereinafter cited as Reese & Leiwant.
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In this case, questions may be raised when a party seeks a trial
court order or commission for an out-of-state deposition 0' or, if
notice is the proper procedure, the opposing party may seek an
order to stop or limit the examination after notice is received.302
Clearly, such objections should be ruled on by the trial state
court.303 Relevance questions may also arise in the discovery state
court if objections are made there to the taking of testimony.
30 4
Usually, such objections would be made by the deponent, but
opposing parties might also ask the discovery state court to limit
or terminate the deposition.
30 5
Different considerations apply depending upon who seeks the
action of the discovery state court. First, if a domiciled deponent
is subpoenaed in the discovery state, that state has an interest in
protecting its citizens from harassment. 30 6 Therefore, it would be
reasonable for the court to rule on objections.307 On the other
hand, if an opposing party chooses to object in the discovery state
court rather than in the trial state court, the discovery state court
need not make potentially difficult and lengthy determinations
about relevance. Since the trial court is more conversant with the
action, it is preferable for the discovery state court to allow the
deposition to proceed and have objections ruled upon later by the
trial state court, absent any statutory necessity for the discovery
state court's deciding relevance.30 8
A few state statutes seem to mandate that the discovery
court decide relevance before issuing a subpoena.30 9 In California,
a subpoena may be issued if it appears "[t]hat the testimony of
[the] witness. .. [is] relevant to the subject matter involved in the
301. See In re Hild, 124 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1953). See also, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R.
3108 (McKinney 1970).
302. See, e.g., N.J. R. CIv. PRAC. 4:10-3; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3103 (McKinney 1970).
303. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1051; cf Schmertz, Written Depositions Under Fed-
eral and State Rules as Cost-Effective Discovery at Home and Abroa 16 VILL. L.
REV. 7, 27 (1970) (party objections to Federal Rule 31 interrogatories should be
decided by trial state court) [hereinafter cited as Schmertz].
304. Reese & Leiwant, supra note 300, at 101-03.
305. See, e.g., ARI. R. Civ. P. 30(d); DEL. SuP. CT. R. 30(d); NEV. R. Civ. P. 30(d); VT. R.
Civ. P. 30(d).
306. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
307. See Schmertz, supra note 303, at 27; Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
308. See In re Cromwell, 50 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256-57 (Sup. Ct.), affld, 268 A.D. 846, 50 N.Y.S.
2d 670 (1944); cf Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050-51 (interests of discovery and trial
states). But see Schmertz, supra note 303, at 27 ("It is submitted that objections to
depositions should be handled where the deposition is to be taken.").
309. AIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
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action or proceeding. "310 In New Mexico, a deponent may only be
required to produce documents that are "material."' 31 In a less
direct manner, the Arizona rule requires a recitation of "such facts
as... must appear to entitle the party to take the deposition." 312
This language indicates that the Arizona court will make rele-
vance determinations.
A large number of other statutes imply that the discovery
state court is to make relevance determinations. In states having
same manner statutes, for example, the court would be authorized
to determine relevance, since the usual state deposition proceed-
ing clearly contemplates this.313 The same conclusion is warranted
in states that authorize the issuance of a subpoena under a spe-
cific state rule, because these rules usually allow discovery only of
relevant information.314 In these states, however, unlike Arizona,
California and New Mexico, the command is less direct, and it is
submitted that the court could decline to decide relevance ques-
tions based on the considerations discussed above. 315
If the discovery state court chooses to decide relevance ques-
tions,3 1 6 a most important question arises: Under the law of which
state is relevance to be determined?31 7 In a few New York cases,
the courts have held that relevance is to be determined under the
law of the trial state, so long as the testimony to be elicited is not
entirely irrelevantsls This seems to be the better view. In deter-
mining relevance, a discovery state court has little interest in pro-
tecting its citizens, unlike situations in which questions of privi-
lege arise.319 Also, the evidence has to be admitted at trial accord-
ing to the laws of the trial state; without an overriding interest,
310. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023(2) (West Supp. 1981).
311. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978). Although the terms "relevant" and "material" may
be distinguished, they are often used interchangeably. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 434 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
CLEARY].
312. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(b).
313. For example, rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after which many state
statutes are modeled, provides that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter... which is relevant." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
314. See note 313 supra.
315. See text accompanying notes 306-08 supra
316. It may be assumed that the trial state court would apply its own law when con-
fronted with relevance objections.
317. Section 138 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states that "[tihe local
law of the forum determines the admissibility of evidence." RESTATEMENT, supra note
268, § 138. However, this rule merely begs the question in cases involving depositions
taken in one state to be used in another, since both states have attributes of the
"forum."
318. In re Roberts, 214 A.D. 271, 275-76, 212 N.Y.S. 183, 187-88 (1925); In re Hild, 124
N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1953); In re McGillvra, 60 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (Sup. Ct.
1946); In re Cromwell, 50 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 268 A.D. 846, 50
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1944); cf. Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050 (where deponent objects,
discovery state law should apply).
319. See text accompanying notes 322-37 infra.
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the discovery state court should not deny parties even potentially
relevant evidence.3 20 Finally, testimony to be obtained in the dis-
covery state may already have the trial state court's imprimatur
- a commission or order - that indicates its relevance, and a dis-
covery state court should not overrule these findings.32 ' For all of
these reasons, relevance should be determined under the law of
the trial state.
C. Law Governing Questions of Privilege
Questions of privilege are more difficult to resolve than those
concerning relevance for several reasons. Unlike relevance issues,
privilege issues involve the clash of important interests of both
the discovery state and the trial state. The discovery state has a
strong interest in protecting its citizens from the revelation of
privileged communications, and the trial state has an equally
strong interest in seeking out all relevant evidence for trial.3 22
Also, whereas relevance law may differ slightly from state to
state, privilege jurisprudence differs markedly.32 3 Although ques-
tions of privilege may arise in the trial state court, this discussion
centers on the considerations to be examined by the discovery
state court when confronted with objections, on privilege
grounds, to its issuance of a subpoena to compel a deposition that
is to be used in another state.
32 4
Choice of law questions involving privilege may be compli-
cated by the interposition of another state's interest - that of the
state with the most significant relationship to the communica-
tion.3 2' This state has made the determination of which communi-
cations made within it should be privileged, and if the parties to
the communication rely on any law at all, it will be that of the
state with the most significant relationship. 26 Therefore, the
interests of all three states must be balanced.
The easiest case for the discovery state court arises when the
communication is not privileged under either its law or that of the
state with the most significant relationship. 27 Even if the infor-
320. See In re Cromwell, 50 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255 (Sup. Ct.), afrd, 268 A.D. 846, 50 N.Y.S.2d
670 (1944).
321. See In re Hild, 124 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Of course, since deposition by
notice is more prevalent today, this is not always the case. See notes 168-87 and
accompanying text supra.
322. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 139 Comments c, d; Reese & Leiwant, supra note
300, at 99, 103; Discovery, supra note 6, at 1050.
323. See, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 311, § 77 at 156-60; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at
528-37 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) (both discussing the proliferation of statutory
privileges).
324. For a good discussion of the principles to be applied by the trial state court, see Reese
& Leiwant, supra note 300, at 99-100.
325. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 268, § 139 Comment e.
326. See, e.g., id Comment c.
327. See Reese & Leiwant, supra note 300, at 101.
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mation might be privileged and, thus, inadmissible in the trial
state, the discovery state court should issue any necessary sub-
poenas, leaving the debate on admissibility to be waged in another
forum.
328
If the communication is not privileged under the discovery
state's law but is privileged under the law of the state with the
most significant relationship, the discovery state court is in a
most difficult situation.32 9 Having no law of its own to apply, the
court must decide whether the interests of the state with the most
significant relationship or of the trial state should govern. 30 If the
information is privileged in the trial state also, the deposition
should not be compelled.3 31 However, the interests of the trial state
may be at odds with those of the state with the most significant
relationship when the communication is not privileged under the
laws of the trial state. Although it has been suggested that the
discovery state court allow the deposition to proceed in that
case,3 2 the interests of the discovery state in protecting its citi-
zens, even relating to communications privileged in one state but
not in the discovery state, would probably be decisive.
333
Another situation is presented when the communication is
privileged under the laws of the discovery state.334 When the dis-
covery state is also the state with the most significant relation-
ship to the communication, the cases indicate that the discovery
state will bar the taking of the deposition.335 Even if the discovery
state is not the state with the most significant relationship, it may
have compelling reasons for refusing to assist the trial state in the
taking of the deposition. 336 When the discovery state has no rela-
tionship with the communication, though, there are few instances
in which it should deny the issuance of a subpoena.
337
VI. PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Although this article has focused primarily on the party wish-
ing to take a deposition outside the trial state, the interests of the




331. Id Whether such an argument could often be made, especially if the trial state court
authorized the deposition by order, is another question.
332. Id at 102.
333. See Discovery, supra note 6, at 1051.
334. See Reese & Leiwant, supra note 300, at 102-03.
335. See In re Franklin Wash. Trust Co., 1 Misc. 2d 697, 148 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1956); In re
Topliffe, 191 Misc. 466, 77 N.Y.S.2d 716, affd, 274 A.D. 760, 80 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1948);
Reese & Leiwant, supra note 300, at 103 & n.58.
336. See Reese & Leiwant, supra note 300, at 103.
337. See id. at 102.
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ability to protect the deponent, usually a domiciliary of the dis-
covery state, via a protective order is of importance. To the extent
that a deponent seeks a protective order based on the grounds of
relevance or privilege, the case should be analyzed in terms of the
principles discussed above.138 When a deponent seeks protection
on other grounds, such as harassment or inconvenience, relevance
and privilege concepts may not apply. Some interstate deposition
statutes touch directly on the subject of protective orders.
A few states have statutes expressly providing for the issu-
ance of protective orders.3 9 Alabama Rule 28(b) provides that
"[o]rders of the character provided in Rules 30(d) . . . and 45(b)
[dealing with protective orders] may be made upon proper applica-
tion therefor by the person to whom such a subpoena is
directed. 340 Substantially identical language may be found in the
Kansas and North Carolina provisions. 41 The Maine rule states
that "any deponent or party" may obtain a protective order,
thereby providing a broader scope of those entitled to relief.
3 42
Although not mentioning the rule under which protective orders
may be granted, the Arizona rule clearly provides for them: "[Any
party or the witness may make such motions as are appropriate
under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure."3 4 3 Similarly, the Mis-
souri rule states that "the circuit court... may make such orders
as could be made if the deposition were intended for use in this jur-
isdiction." 34 4 Also, New York has a provision that allows courts to
"make any appropriate order in aid of taking such a deposition. '345
A large number of state statutes provide for the issuance of
protective orders by implication. For instance, four states have
statutes that allow a court to punish disobedience or contempt in
338. See notes 300-21 and accompanying text supra (relevance); notes 322-37 and accom-
panying text supra (privilege).
339. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(2)(ii);
N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); see ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
340. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
341. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
342. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(2). Since an application for a subpoena from a Maine court is
docketed as a civil action, id 30(h)(2)(i), true "parties" exist in the Maine courts. It is
not wise, however, to allow party litigants to use the Maine courts as another forum
to block the taking of a deposition, especially where their pleas have been heard and
rejected by the trial court. See text accompanying notes 304-08 supra. Therefore,
protective orders should be confined as much as possible to those made on the depon-
ent's motion.
343. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h). The Arizona procedure is similar to that of Maine. See text
accompanying notes 146, 159 supra. Therefore, the considerations discussed in note
342 supra apply.
344. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08.
345. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3102(e) (McKinney 1970).
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the same manner as when the deposition is to be used in the dis-
covery state.3 46 These statutes also permit a court to refuse to
punish a deponent for contempt in cases where a protective order
would have been issued. To relieve parties of the uncertainty of
that procedure, a court should be able to issue a protective order
in advance. Section 3.02 of the UIIPA also implies that a court
may issue a protective order. The UIIPA grants courts a large
amount of discretion in issuing an order to compel testimony
347
and provides that "[t]he order... may prescribe the practice and
procedure... for taking the testimony or statement.' '348 This lan-
guage gives a court the power to compel testimony on the condi-
tion that the deponent not be required to answer certain questions
or be harassed in a particular way. States having same manner
statutes present a simple case. 49 Since every state having a same
manner statute also provides for the protection of the deponent,350
a deponent merely has to follow the individual state procedure.
A number of states have statutes that neither expressly nor
impliedly authorize the issuance of protective orders.3 51 Generally,
346. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982). The
Hawaii statute also provides that "such additional or other orders as would be proper
if the deposition were for use in this state" may be issued. HAWAII REV. STAT. §
624-27 (1976). Although this language is similar to that found in the Arizona and
Missouri rules, ARiz. R. Civ. P. 30(h); Mo. R. CIv. P. 57.08, it follows the phrase "Iilf
any witness fails to obey the subpoena," which casts into doubt its general applic-
ability.
347. See text accompanying notes 230-35 supra.
348. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
349. For a compilation of those states with same manner provisions, see note 178 supra.
Some provisions normally considered same manner statutes have already been
discussed. See text accompanying notes 345 (New York) & 346 (Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, and Iowa) supra.
350. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1), (d) (West Supp. 1981); CONN. SUP. CT. R. §§
167D, 187A(e); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 30(d) (District of Columbia); D.C. SUPER. CT. R.
Civ. P. 26(c), 28-1(b), 30(d); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2105(c) (1981);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (West Supp. 1981); MD. R.P. 406; NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 25-1267.22, .24 (1979); NEV. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 30(d); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 44; N.D. R.
CIv. P. 26(c), 30(d); OHIO R. Civ. P. 26(C), 30(D); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 548 (West
1960); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 41.618, 45.185 (1979-1980); S.C. CIR. CT. PRAC. R. 87H(1),
(2); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-6-26(c), -30(d) (Supp. 1980); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.02,
.04; TEX. R. Civ. P. 186b; UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(c), 30(d); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 30(d); VA.
SUP. CT. R. 4:1(c); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 30(d).
351. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; MINN. R. Civ.
P. 45.04; MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC.
4:11-4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969); WASH.
SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West
1966).
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courts in these states should be able to issue orders protecting
deponents from harassment or inconvenience. In about half of
these provisions, reference is made to other sections that allow the
quashing of subpoenas duces tecum 5 2 Thus, at least limited
power to protect deponents exists. More importantly, most of
these statutes allow for judicial discretion in issuing subpoenas.153
Deponents may therefore be protected from harassment or incon-
venience by the exercise of this discretion. Finally, even in the
absence of an implied or express provision, deponents may be pro-
tected by the court's power over its own process; no court would
refuse to provide a deponent relief from a subpoena issued by the
same court.6
VII. SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM
To the litigator, discovery of documents3 55 is as important as
the taking of testimony.3 16 Between parties, discovery of docu-
ments may be accomplished by a request to produce, as set out in
either the federal or state rules.3 7 Because non-parties are not
susceptible to requests for the production of documents, 3 8 some
other procedural device is necessary to obtain documents in their
possession. The subpoena duces tecum fills this need.
Production of documents creates the same problems as the
taking of testimony when, in a state court action, discovery is
sought from a non-party found outside of the trial state .3 9 An in-
quiry must therefore be made as to whether state interstate depo-
sition statutes provide for or prohibit the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum to aid a proceeding in a court of another state.
Interstate deposition statutes vary with respect to subpoenas
duces tecum. Some statutes explicitly provide for them. Others
allow for their use by providing that the usual discovery state pro-
cedures apply when taking a deposition for use in another state.
In turn, these procedures provide for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum. Finally, some states have statutes that are silent on
352. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(c); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; MINN. R. Civ. P.
45.04; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d).
353. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. Civ. PRAC. 4:11-4; R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 28(d);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
354. See, e.g., In re Denning, 44 Del. 470, 61 A.2d 657 (1948).
355. The phrase "discovery of documents" is used here to mean not only discovery of
actual papers but also discovery of any other physical evidence allowed by state law.
356. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 36, § 2202 at 585-86.
357. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34; ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 34; MASS. R. Civ. P. 34; OHio R. Civ. P.
34; VT. R. Civ. P. 34.
358. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34; ARIz. R. Civ. P. 34; MASS. R. Civ. P. 34; OHIo R. Civ. P.
34; VT. R. Civ. P. 34.
359. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
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the subject. In these states, the use of a subpoena duces tecum
must be inferred.
A. Statutes Explicitly Providing for Subpoenas Duces Tecum
A number of state statutes have language that explicitly men-
tions the production of documents to be used in a proceeding out-
side the discovery state. Of those, a few stipulate the subpoena
duces tecum.360 Most states in this category provide for the "pro-
duction of documents" rather than for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum, although the result is the same.
36 1
The UIIPA, for instance, provides that "[a] court of this state
may order a person who is domiciled or is found within this state
... to produce documents or other things for use in a proceeding in
a tribunal outside this state." '362 The Arkansas rule also provides
for the production of a "document or other thing. 3 63 The Min-
nesota rule uses even broader language: "The subpoena may com-
mand the person'to whom it is directed to produce and permit in-




In two states, discovery may not be as broad. The New Hamp-
shire statute provides for the "production of papers. ' 36 5 This does
not seem to encompass the "other things" allowed by the UIIPA
states. New Mexico allows the production of "such books, papers
and writings as may be deemed material. '36 6 Again, physical
evidence such as parts of a car involved in an accident or an ore
sample would not seem to fall within the bounds of the New Mex-
ico statute 7.3 6 Discovery of documents is clearly encompassed in
both statutes.
The language of the Hawaii statute lies on the border between
those provisions which explicitly mention the production of docu-
360. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).
361. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c); IND. R. TRIAL P. 28(E); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3824 (West
1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 11 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.1852(2) (1981); MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18
(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1703.02 (West
1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5326 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
362. UIIPA, supra note 4, § 3.02 at 492.
363. ARK. R. Civ. P. 28(c).
364. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04. Despite the broader language, the scope of discovery should
not be significantly greater in Minnesota than in a UIIPA state.
365. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:18 (1974).
366. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978). A second New Mexico provision relating to the pro-
duction of documents states that "no witness shall be required to deliver up any
book, paper or writing to be annexed to the said deposition and taken out of this
state, but a copy of the same may be annexed to such deposition." Id § 38-8-2.
367. This may present problems if the scope of discovery is significantly narrower in the
discovery state than in the trial state. See Schmertz, supra note 303, at 26-27. Hope-
fully, the discovery state court would allow the broader discovery.
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ments and those which refer to other statutes allowing the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum. Although the Hawaii provision
generally requires that depositions to be used in foreign courts be
taken in the same manner as those to be used in Hawaii, the
statute also provides that any witness who "fails to... produce a
book or paper pursuant to a subpoena" may be punished for con-
tempt. 6 Thus, at least in part, the use of a subpoena duces tecum
is expressly authorized by the Hawaii statute.1
9
B. Statutes Implicitly Allowing Subpoenas Duces Tecum
The great majority of states allow the use of subpoenas duces
tecum not by providing for them in the interstate deposition
statute but rather by adopting by reference other statutes that
allow compulsory process for production of documents. These
statutes are of two different types: first, those that refer to a
specific statute; and second, same manner provisions.
Most states referring to a specific statute provide that a court
may issue a subpoena pursuant to the state analogue to Federal
Rule 45(d).3 10 All of the statutes or rules to which the interstate
deposition provisions refer allow the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum;371 thus, this device is available to out-of-discovery-state
litigants wishing to have documents produced for a foreign court
proceeding. The South Carolina statute, however, makes reference
to another provision that does not explicitly provide for sub-
poenas duces tecum, thus casting their availability to foreign liti-
gants into doubt. 372 South Carolina courts do recognize that a sub-
poena may be accompanied by a request to produce documents
373
and, thus, the procedure should be available to aid a foreign state
court.
374
The question of the availability of subpoenas duces tecum
also arises in those states having same manner provisions. Since
these provisions merely adopt the usual state procedure for taking
depositions to be used out of state, the procedure of each state
368. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976).
369. In any event, rule 45(d) of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the issu-
ance of a subpoena duces tecum.
370. ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(e); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-228(d) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME. R. Civ. P. 30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08;
MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.J. R. CIv. PRAC. 4:11-4; N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); W. VA. R. Civ.
P. 28(d).
371. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 45(d); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 45(d); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 45(d); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-245(b) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 45.04; ME. R. Civ. P. 45; Mo. R. Civ. P.
57.09(b); MONT. R. Civ. P. 45(d); N.J. R. CIV. PRAC. 4:14-7; N.C. R. Civ. P. 45; W. VA.
R. Civ. P. 45.
372. S.C. CODE § 19-15-90 (1976). See also i& § 19-15-50.
373. See Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 532, 103 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1957).
374. See In re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 110 P. 547 (1910).
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must be examined to determine whether production of documents
is allowed. Each state having a same manner provision also pro-
vides elsewhere for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum,
however, 75 and their use to aid in discovery for a foreign judicial
proceeding should not be questioned.
A few interstate deposition statutes neither explicitly allow
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum nor refer to other provi-
sions of state law that allow for them.3 7 In these states, the argu-
ment might be made that, since the statutory language refers only
to testimony, production of documents is foreclosed.37 7 This argu-
ment was rejected by a Washington court in In re Bolster.1
7
8
In Bolster, a commission authorizing the taking of a deposi-
tion and production of books and records was issued by a Cali-
fornia court to a Washington notary.3 79 The witness appeared to
testify but failed to bring the requested books and records with
him.38 ° The lower court refused to require the witness to produce
the documents, and on appeal it was argued that the court did not
have the authority to issue a subpoena duces tecum. Although the
Washington interstate deposition provision made no mention of
the production of documents, 38' other provisions of the Washing-
ton statute did allow for their production. In concluding that a
narrow construction of the interstate deposition statute was inap-
propriate,382 the Bolster court stated: "Manifestly the [interstate
deposition provision was] intended to make effective the previous
sections of the statute and these, as we have seen, authorize offi-
cers empowered to take depositions to issue subpoenas requiring
the production of books and other documents.
' 3  3
The approach taken by the court in Bolster is applicable to
other interstate deposition statutes mentioning testimony only.
375. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(b) (West Supp. 1981); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P.
45(d)(1); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.410(d)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2112(a) (West 1974); MD. R.P.
407(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1224 (1979); NEV. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R.
3111 (McKinney 1970); N.D. R. Civ. P. 45(d); OHIO R. Civ. P. 45(D)(1); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 44.110,45.190 (1979-1980); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 15-6-45(d) (Supp. 1980); TENN.
R. Civ. P. 45.04; TEx. R. Civ. P. 201; UTAH R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1); VT. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1);
VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(c); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 45(d).
376. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-111 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.84 (West Supp. 1981-1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-3-97 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-11 (1969); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R.
45(d)(4); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 887.24 (West 1966).
377. See In re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 657, 110 P. 547, 548 (1910).
378. 59 Wash. 655, 110 P. 547 (1910).
379. Id at 655-56, 110 P. at 547.
380. Id at 656, 110 P. at 547-48.
381. Id at 657, 110 P. at 548. The current version may be found at WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV.
R. 45(d)(4).
382. 59 Wash. 655, 657, 110 P. 547, 548 (1910).
383. Id. at 657-58, 110 P. at 548.
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Since in these states subpoenas duces tecum are recognized either
by statute8 4 or by judicial decision,38 5 there is little reason to make
them unavailable to foreign litigants. Therefore, it appears that
production of documents may also be accomplished in these
states.
C. Special Procedures Relating to Subpoenas Duces Tecum
A few states have special procedures that are used only when
subpoenas duces tecum are requested. Also, many states have
procedures for quashing a subpoena duces tecum in addition to
the procedures for protecting a deponent, although these proce-
dures often are not reflected in the interstate deposition provision.
Therefore, an examination of those procedures is in order.
The Delaware statute has a special procedure for obtaining a
subpoena duces tecum.3 86 While a subpoena for taking testimony
is ordinarily issued by the Prothonotary of the Superior Court,
"[n]o subpoena duces tecum shall be issued by the Prothonotary
except upon an order of the Superior Court entered upon an appli-
cation therefor to such Court, upon such notice to such witnesses
as to the Court may seem proper." 387 This language adds two addi-
tional requirements to the normal procedure for obtaining a sub-
poena duces tecum. First, it automatically interposes a court
between the out-of-state litigant and the Prothonotary. Second, it
explicitly provides that notice to the deponent may be required
before a subpoena duces tecum will be issued. These requirements
probably reflect the additional burdens that may be imposed by a
subpoena duces tecum.
New Mexico has two requirements that relate solely to the
production of documents. First, a deponent may only be required
to produce documents "as may be deemed material. 3 8 Another
provision states that "no witness shall be required to deliver up
any book, paper or writing to be annexed to the said deposition
384. Statutes or rules authorizing subpoenas duces tecum are found in Colorado, COLO. R.
Civ. P. 45(b), Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981-1982), Iowa, IOWA R. Civ. P. 155(c), Rhode Island, R.I. R. Civ. P. 45(d), and
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 805.07(1), (2) (West 1977).
385. Courts in Mississippi and New Hampshire have long recognized the use of a sub-
poena duces tecum. See Long v. Sledge, 209 So. 2d 814, 819 (Miss. 1968); Hall v.
Young, 37 N.H. 134 (1858). As noted above, Washington courts have decided that the
use of subpoenas duces tecum is allowed under the state interstate deposition rule. In
re Bolster, 59 Wash. 655, 110 P. 547 (1910).
386. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4311 (1974).
387. Id See also text accompanying notes 250-54.
388. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-1 (1978).
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and taken out of this state, but a copy of the same may be annexed
to such deposition. '" ' 89 This provision should create no particular
problems. 9°
The most important provisions relating to production of docu-
ments deal with the quashing of a subpoena duces tecum. These
provisions may be applied to subpoenas for the production of
documents to be used in other states in several ways. For exam-
ple, an interstate deposition statute may provide explicitly for the
quashing of subpoenas duces tecum.3 91 More frequently, state
foreign deposition statutes refer to other state procedural laws
that deal with quashing subpoenas duces tecum.392 Finally, the
laws of the discovery state may be used through application of a
same manner statute.3 93 As with both location requirements and
witness fees, it must be assumed that a state has some provision
relating to quashing a subpoena duces tecum. If it is not found in
the interstate deposition statute, state procedure must be
examined further.
3 94
The Minnesota interstate deposition rule provides:
The person to whom the subpoena is directed may...
serve upon the attorney designated in the subpoena writ-
ten objection to the production, inspection or copying of
any or all of the designated materials. If objection is
made, the party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled
to the production or [sic], nor the right to inspect and copy
the materials except pursuant to an order of the court
from which the subpoena was issued. The party serving
the subpoena may, if objection has been made, move upon
notice to the deponent for an order at any time before or
during the taking of the deposition.
3 95
This rule provides for protection of the person who is to produce
documents by allowing objection and court action. If no objection
is made, no court intervention is required.
389. Id. § 38-8-2.
390. Although copies of documents may sometimes be inadmissible in the trial state court
under the "best evidence rule," see CLEARY, supra note 311, § 236 at 567-69, a recital
of the New Mexico statute should provide ample excuse for not tendering the
original. See id § 238 at 571-72.
391. See MiNN R. Civ. P. 45.04(2).
392. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); IDAHO R.
Civ. P. 28(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME. R. Civ. P.
30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); W. VA. R.
Civ. P. 28(d).
393. See note 397 and accompanying text infra.
394. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each state's procedure. This section
will merely touch upon those state provisions arising, or referred to, in interstate
deposition statutes. For a discussion of whether discovery state procedure need
apply at all, see text accompanying notes 267-99 supra.
395. MINN. R. Civ. P. 45.04(2). Compare id with FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1).
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Although Minnesota is the only state providing for such a
procedure in its interstate deposition rule, many state statutes
adopt a similar one by reference.39 6 The same result may be
reached in states with same manner statutes which also have
special provisions relating to the quashing of subpoenas duces
tecum. 397 Therefore, discovery state procedure in this area must be
closely scrutinized.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Interstate deposition statutes provide a means of facilitating
discovery across state lines when litigants are involved in an
action in state court. In so doing, they have the potential of mak-
ing interstate discovery as simple in the state court system as it is
in the federal court system. Unfortunately, the numerous vari-
eties of interstate deposition statutes, their inconsistencies, and
their ambiguities leave them far short of their potential.
A unified system is desirable in this area, and often it is a
uniform act which meets this goal. The UFDA, the earliest
attempt at uniformity, was adopted by less than half of the states.
Because the UFDA is overly simplistic, it fails to meet some of the
complex problems arising when depositions are taken in one state
to be used in another. The UIIPA is a vast improvement over the
UFDA. Its approach is to allow the discovery state court discre-
tion in fashioning the methods of interstate discovery. Discovery
is traditionally an area in which the court has discretionary power,
and this Act provides the flexibility necessary to deal with the
many possible situations.
Few states have abandoned their older statutes in favor of the
UIIPA, thus contributing to the jumble of provisions dealing with
interstate depositions. Unless one statute can be fashioned and
adopted by a great majority of states, the practitioner will remain
saddled with the unwieldy variety of interstate deposition
statutes whenever litigation leads out of the home state. The
UIIPA offers a handy solution to this problem and should be
closely examined by the state legislatures.
396. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 28(b); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 27(c); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(h); IDAHO R.
Civ. P. 28(e); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-228(d) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 28.03; ME. R. Civ. P.
30(h); Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.08; MONT. R. Civ. P. 28(d); N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(d); W. VA. R.
Civ. P. 28(d).
397. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-148e(f) (West Supp. 1981) (same manner
statute); id § 52-148e(c) (objection to subpoena duces tecum); D.C. CODE ANN. §
14-103 (1973) (same manner statute); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (applicable in District of
Columbia) (objection to subpoena duces tecum); D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 45(d)(1)
(objection to subpoena duces tecum); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 624-27 (1976) (same man-
ner statute); HAWAII R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (objection to subpoena duces tecum). For a
compilation of other same manner provisions, see note 178 supra.
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